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The Impact of War on U.S. Army Leader Self-Development Domain in the Early 21st Century

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The Impact of War on U.S. Army Leader Self-Development Domain
in the Early 21st Century

by

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Business Administration
Muma College of Business
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U.S. Army, Leadership, Leadership-development, War

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my late father and fellow veteran. He literally dragged me to my first day of college; and although his methods changed, he always encouraged me to learn and so much more.

This is also for the U.S. Army, lest another chapter is added to “America’s First Battles.” America can never take victory for granted. There are some additional thoughts about this in Appendix I, which is focused at those in uniform.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To all of my many superior, subordinate, and peer mentors and educators during my leadership development journey—thank you for your time, energy, and caring. I am a little piece of all of you;—even the bad ones, but in a good way. A special person was the spark that ignited my self-development domain, and ultimately this research. Thank you, Major Dixon (now retired Lieutenant Colonel and Dr. Deirdre Dixon at the University of Tampa). If I had the leadership in your pinkie alone, I'd be a better leader. You make it look so easy.

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ABSTRACT

This qualitative research examines senior U.S. Army officer leaders' propensity and appreciation to engage in self-devolvement and to develop their junior leaders. The research compares what the Army is prescribing to its leaders with what they are actually saying and doing. It focuses on the decade before the Global War on Terrorism, during the high-tempo war period, and the last ten years. We find that the past 19 years of war have impacted the U.S. Army in countless ways. One is arguably on its most precious capability—its active officer leaders. As the Army rose to war-related challenges, it did so at leader-development costs. Little time, focus, and a battle environment left developing others and oneself low on the list of priorities. Less officer nurturing in the past will have an amplified and harmful effect in the near and distant future; unless, of course, the Army understands its self-development state-of-affairs today and takes action to bolster adult learning. It is no longer a question of if the Army wants to develop its leadership seed-corn, but if they can.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

We don't know how more difficult leading will become, but we know-for-sure-that it will become more difficult. We know-for-sure-that it will take more of everything: more attention, more learning, more effort. (Dempsey & Brafman, 2018, p. 171)

The profession of arms in America strives to be a learning organization (United States Department of the Army (DA), 2012a, pp. 7–33). It is continuously adapting, relearning, and transforming to overmatch potential adversaries (Senge, 2010). One cornerstone of this endeavor is to produce the highest caliber leaders with vision and expertise that lead the body in the present and better it for the future. Their own doctrine can easily sum up the U.S. Army's emphasis of leadership: "leaders are the competitive advantage the Army possesses that technology cannot replace nor be substituted by advanced weaponry and platforms" (DA, 2015, p. vi).

This research focuses new attention on a fundamental challenge for America's Army—leadership development—more specifically, self-development. Terry McGovern (2009) sums up both well, "Fundamentally, all development is self-development, and becoming a leader is a challenging journey of continuous learning and self-development" (p. 39). The Army has rightfully given much of its effort to the wars in the early 21st century, but at leader development costs. The amount of time available for self-development alone justifies this, but there is also the leader's physical climate to consider (Knowles, 1975). Repeated deployments, which include resetting from the last while simultaneously preparing for future ones, is a frustrating agenda.

Aslanian and Brickells' (1980) work summarize this and adds a development twist, "To know an adult's life schedule, is to know an adult's learning schedule" (pp. 60–61).

The research and conclusion described herein suggest the Global War on Terrorism, more specifically, the Army's efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, have caused a severely reduced ability to develop current and future officer leaders. This will result in an undesirable leader snowball effect if not recognized, understood, and ultimately redirected. Given this, the research question asks: How have 19 years of war impacted the U.S. Army's leader self-development today; and perhaps more broadly, how could his influence future leaders for many years to come? The Army is undoubtedly concerned about the future, as well (U.S. Army, 2014):

It is not enough for leaders to tolerate or even grow comfortable with the uncertainty described in the future environment. Operating in this complex environment requires agile, adaptive, and ethical leaders trained and educated to improve and thrive in uncertainty. These leaders must possess a natural inclination for disruptive innovation and an abiding sense of urgency both in times of crisis and times of opportunity. They must be professionals of strong character, physically supreme, and resilient to overcome the effects of the great trauma that is the experience of war. The Army must empower Soldiers not only with exquisite technology, but also with broad cultural understanding, professional judgment, critical thinking, and technical skills, so that they can adapt to unforeseen and unpredictable conditions as they emerge. (p. 10)

A crucial aspect of Army soldier-leader improvement is the reliance on self-development, which is one of three "domains" that makes up the Army Leader Development Model (ALDM) in Figure 1. The "operational domain" is experience, mentoring, programmed training, and some unsurprisingly productive on-the-job-training. The "institutional domain" is time spent away from practice and work, and mainly in formal educational and structured training scenarios. The third domain is "self-development;" that is largely as it sounds, but it is better known as self-directed or adult learning in academic literature (DA, 2019, p. 6-1–6-4). The three domains are

designed to complement one another, which is depicted by the overlapping circles in Army doctrine.




Figure 1. U.S. Army Leader Development Model

Examples of Army self-development include reading military history, manuals, and professional magazines; taking courses and pursuing higher education during non-duty hours; foreign language and culture study, and practicing extracurricular physical and mental fitness. For the Army, the ‘self’ aspect is larger than just hoping officers prepare, and is the research’s focus (DA, 2012b, p. 1-2). This begs an obvious question: Are individual leaders practicing what the Army is expecting of them?

Over time, the ALDM and individual leader capacity should have a positive slope. This is an accumulation of experience, programmed periods of professional training, academic opportunities, and ever-increasing positions of responsibility. These also coincide with the Army’s leadership levels: direct, organizational, and strategic; and officer ranks: lieutenant, captain, major, colonel, and general (DA, 2015, pp. 1–22). The Army’s strong desire is that

mentoring also has some exponential impact on an individual’s proclivity to seek and engage in self-development (described more in Chapter 2).

1.1 Problem

“[L]eaders must prepare themselves and act to promote long-term stewardship of the [profession]” according to the Army (DA, 2015, p. 8). Given this strong assertion, a problem emerged from a 2001 Army study on officer leadership development; it concluded, “Most officers understand the importance and role of self-development in lifelong learning. However, [the] Army... does not adequately address it... does not emphasize its value... does not provide the tools and support to enable its leaders to make self-development an effective component of lifelong learning” (DA, 2011, p. 11). Nine years later, another research project identified similar problems and proposed like solutions (Dougherty Jr, 2010). More recent studies see self-development in a better light (Riley, Cavanaugh, Fallesen, & Jones, 2016); but what if the trend is skewed by leaders who have little appreciation for learning today and are ill-suited to ‘act to promote?’ This researcher, a retired officer with 20 years of service, noticed a change in officers as well.¹ This shared observation is not an admonishment, but rather, a curiosity to uncover and explain. Prior research and the author’s own experience might make the ALDM look more like Figure 2.

¹ I am no longer in uniform, but still work around mostly officers as an Army Civilian – 30 years total.




Figure 2. Author’s Perception of the ALDM

The Army organization expects its more senior leaders to guide and foster junior ones (DA, 2017b, p. 1), or as Brockett and Hiemstra’s (1991) Personal Responsibility Orientation model would say, “[provide] an educational agent” (p. 24). The Army may have several cohorts of these leaders that are less capable of fostering self-development in their subordinates. Their own study admits as much, “If the Army does not commit to the developmental domain of the profession, the treasure of military experience in its current officers will vanish from its ranks as people retire or leave the Army” (Adamshick, 2013, p. 22).

Young lieutenants and captains that served between 2001 and 2015 were, and still are, in constant overseas deployment cycles. More senior leaders in the ranks of majors, lieutenant colonel, and colonel experienced the same repetitious deployments. These ‘young’ soldiers are now the senior lieutenant colonels, as well as the higher-ranking colonels and beyond. Figure 3 depicts this by plotting time on both axes’, the war-period, leaders’ service length, and their associated advance in rank (developed by the author).

future? To highlight this, when the Army's own "War College" asked, "How well does the Army develop strategic leaders?" its faculty grades were poor. The best grade was a C+, while many gave an F. One prominent professor captured the overall commentary, "If the U.S. Army did develop highly skilled strategic leaders, would the Army realize it?" (War Room, 2018).

Historically, the military has risen to many challenges in the relatively short existence of the US. While most starts were slow and perilous (Heller & Stofft, 1986), the results have proven their value, since the country remains. Still, longstanding and newer challenges persist, and no one in the profession can ignore the many calls for more adaptive, hyper-creative, and critical-thinking leaders in military professional magazines, in its doctrine and in online articles (M. Ryan, 2020, pp. 6–11). Meanwhile, belligerent nation and non-nation state conflicts are making daily headlines—even talk of nuclear "mutually assured destruction" is becoming in vogue again.

1.3 Study Significance

For the Army, better realizing its self-development state-of-affairs would be a start. This can and should lead to justified policy changes and reallocation of resources. The whole force should improve with time as adult learners reach ever higher degrees of synthesizing information (Anderson & Bloom, 2001). The Army found itself reflecting after the Vietnam War as well; the result was a 2,500-page study, which largely set the objectives and path for leader-development through the late 1990s (Adamshick, 2013, p. 49).

In a larger sense, the world is a dangerous place, and some argue, more complex than ever before. Newer clashes can be found in space, the web, via social influence, in mega-cities, and more recently, via artificial intelligence (Greer, 2018). Is one or more of these a potential Achilles heel for the Nation? Complicating the military landscape for planners are significant

changes to the environment, global socio-economic conditions, and ever-increasing competition for natural resources. The recent COVID-19 pandemic is an example of shock planners cannot anticipate in detail. The fragility of nation-states is well documented throughout history, and this alone should keep self-development at the forefront of leaders' minds.

All of this will be worse if Army leadership gaps are too wide. The military needs superb leaders during trying times, and not only in the Army. The same self-development situation might be resident in the Navy, Air Force, and Marines officer corps. Beyond officers, the more numerous senior non-commissioned officer corps could be afflicted as well. Ultimately, this research can expand the body of evidence that attempts to understand and cultivate adult learning and potentially accelerate the process altogether (Annis, 2016, pp. 116–118).

1.4 Limitations

Researching the U.S. Army is like 'hitting a moving target' to use their own aphorism. It is always changing, and over time, mostly improves via evolution versus some radical revolution.² It is also large and unsurprisingly bureaucratic. It has its own study and research programs, but they do not accommodate independent efforts like this paper. After great effort, access to many years of raw Army self-development data was not possible. The limitations to the research are purposefully mentioned now to give the reader some additional context of a changing Army and officer corps.

Other situations that cannot be controlled for in the methodology are many. Since the Army is a volunteer force, its numbers and quality ebbs and flows. This is articulated well in the

² This is an ongoing and healthy debate in military circles. Many professional military journals are calling for 'revolutions' in this or that. The "Revolution in Military Affairs" pundits point to great leaps in technology and infrastructure. The iterative side addresses change over longer periods of time, and posit 'revolutions' are only known after the fact, so trying to create one is less useful.

controversial book, “Bleeding Talent: How the US Military Mismanages Great Leaders and Why it’s Time for a Revolution” by Tim Kane (2012). There was an Army-led “Reduction in Force” (RIF) in the mid-to-late 1990s, and then a leader “exodus” from around 2004 to at least 2010 (Kane, 2012, pp. 86–95). This author admits seeing some of the best and brightest trade boots for loafers, but not all. Kane also makes a convincing case about the long degradation of officer entrance standards (read quality) (2012, p. 37-41), which was echoed by a (Army) War College Strategic Studies Institute book in late 2017 (Coumbe, 2010; Coumbe, Condly, & Skimmyhorn, 2017). The research, therefore, cannot control for overall officer quality.

An effort in the late 1990s changed officers’ careers from a multi-track to a single-track system (it remains today) (DA, 2019, p. 3). This meant officers only retained one specialized occupation from the beginning of a career to leaving. Prior to this, officers had several unrelated skills and moved back and forth between assignments over the years. The idea was to focus an individual on one thing to become an expert. Although this sounds appropriate, it is counterintuitive to what the Army eventually wants—officers in the rank of general (generalist), leading large and diverse organizations. All of these facts impact today’s force, its leaders, and their sense of the value of self-development.

A less obvious situation is the closure of installation officers’ clubs; it is relevant because it impacted all officers regardless of rank. These physical spaces were built around in-person discourse, eating, relaxing, and admittedly some overindulgence in libations. A typical ‘o-club’ had dozens of sitting rooms; there were tables strewn with military professional journals and newspapers from around the world and bookcases full of history and military autobiographies. These spaces allowed leaders to play golf, tennis, swim, eat, sit and mostly importantly, talk. They died a quick death in the late 1990s after alcohol consumption was “deglamorized,” but

mostly because a new venue was set to revolutionize communications and learning—the internet (and cost savings). The impact of this alone on self-development could be surprisingly large, but uncontrolled for.

Finally, the Army has launched efforts to address a myriad of leadership challenges. However, these are ‘works-in-progress,’ albeit welcome. They include a complete overhaul of the officer evaluation reporting system to better identify and grow superior leaders. A recently revived 2012 effort by the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) called, “The U.S. Army Human Dimension Concept,” provides a holistic approach to improving what the Army considers its most crucial resource—its soldiers, civilians, and even their supporting families (DA, 2014b). Figure 4 attempts to capture the many facets of this complex landscape, which includes self-development. The authors even endeavor to “accelerate” the entire process but make a potentially poor or plainly erroneous assumption: “Army professionals will remain committed to career-long learning and self-development” (DA, 2018, p. 7).




Figure 4. Human Dimension Integration Framework

Also untested is the newly published “Army People Strategy” that outlines objectives to reform “talent” acquisition, development, employment, and retention by 2028 (Grinston,

McConville, & McCarthy, 2019b, pp. 6–8). This researcher’s friend quipped, “I think I read a similar strategy back in 2001.” The Army has even introduced the “Innovative Leaders Course” at its Combined Arms Center, also known as the "Intellectual Center of the Army" (<https://home.army.mil/leavenworth/index.php>). Some Army organizations even have dedicated “initiative groups,” perhaps because the larger body lacks it.

The remainder of the research follows a classical format. The next chapter introduces the volumes of academic research and generally accepted theories on self-development. The second half of the chapter highlights Army sources that describe the domain in question and ends with previous Army-sponsored research and results. Chapter 3 is the methodology used to answer the research question, while Chapter 4 presents the analysis and some results. The concluding chapter folds together what the Army wants and what its officers are doing insofar as self-development, and since they contrast, it offers some recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

“...you will learn a great deal by a method I call absorption...” Then Major Dwight Eisenhower’s critique of Army’s past institutional domain. (Runkle, 2019, p. 148)

This chapter provides a macro compilation of papers, books, and articles that reveal the complex and difficult topic of understanding adult learning. Although some may consider academia and the military miles apart (and they can be), there is unsurprising continuity in how both understand and exercise human development: “Leader development generally occurs through three mechanisms—formal instruction, work assignments, and self-directed learning” (Boyce, Zaccaro, & Wisecarver, 2010, p. 159). This is essentially the Army’s three domains mentioned earlier. The Army section of the chapter is purposefully more detailed because that is the focus of the research.

Self-development is one expression that gains a long following of associated but interrelated terms in learning and education: tacit, self-directed, self-determination, adult, informal, collective, lifelong, knowledge-society, and continuing. Most works acknowledge the individual motivation required and extol the benefits to managers and organizations in the process. Others provide a more holistic approach to self-development that considers one’s environment, the organization’s values, and basic physiological needs (Sackett, Karrasch, Weyhrauch, & Goldman, 2016). A few pieces touch on technology and what that might mean in the future (Crowley, Shanley, Rothenberg, & Sollinger, 2013; Livingstone, 2006), but it will likely include artificial intelligence and some personalized learning agenda (Gagné, 2013, pp.

321–326). Most of the papers reviewed gave value to the importance of consciousness or self-awareness in promoting self-development; many of these present a 360-degree-like feedback tool as one way to assist in achieving this (McCarthy & Garavan, 1999; Merriam & Baumgartner, 2020).

Although the Army championed these holistic self-assessments for many years, the Secretary of the Army “eliminate[d] the requirement for all noncommissioned officers..., and civilian leaders to conduct a leader 360 assessment” in an effort to promote readiness and lethality (Esper, 2018). Another disappointing trend, specifically in terms of self-development in the military, is that research is simply very limited (Annis, 2016; Chung, 2011; McGovern, 2009; Wenzel, 2015). At least ‘limited’ to research like this, because longitudinal studies that do exist are mostly behind military-enabled firewalls, or in proprietary and funded research databases (contracts paid for by the Army, no less). Cho’s (2002) work on the interconnectedness of self-directed learning and learning organizations further supports the concern that the Army’s situation is less than stellar.

The good news for the Army is that other professions and industries have regularly applied survey techniques to test self-development. One prominent and established version is the Self-Directed Learning Readiness Scale (for more information, visit: <http://www.lpasdlrs.com/>).

2.1 Academic

Even better news for the Army is that academic literature is stuffed with adult learning research; it is, after all, why academia exists. There is an entire international society “dedicated to the promotion of self-directed lifelong learning and to the encouragement and dissemination of continued research on self-directed learning both within and outside of institutional contexts” (<https://www.sdlglobal.com/>). A good primer for those new to leading is from *The Leadership*

Quarterly, “Advances in leader and leadership development: A review of 25 years of research and theory” (Day, Fleenor, Atwater, Sturm, & McKee, 2014). This paper introduces all of the basic concepts, such as transactional and transformational leaders, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, traits, development, attributes, et al. An up-front self-development definition from Knowles (1975) is good to keep in mind reading forward:

A process in which individuals takes the initiative, with or without the help of others, in diagnosing their learning needs, formulating learning goals, identifying human and material resources for learning, choosing and implementing appropriate learning strategies, and evaluating learning outcomes. (p. 18)

One 752-page tomb is a fantastic source, but hardly something influential and busy Army leaders will cozy up with in their free time, “Self-determination Theory: Basic psychological needs in motivation, development, and wellness” (R. M. Ryan & Deci, 2017). Researchers working for the Army might, but these works rarely see the light of day, and their impact is questionable (if not a mystery). This author recommends “Learning in Adulthood” by Sharan Merriam and Rosemary Caffarella (1999) for those interested in similar research. At roughly half the page count to Self-determination Theory, it is comprehensive, easier to read, and has a lengthy reference list (a new 2020 4th edition exists, Merriam & Baumgartner, 2020).

As mentioned, adult or self-directed learning has a host of names, but at the core, they have three goals. This review is concerned most about one: Enhancing the ability of leaders to be self-directed in their learning (Merriam & Caffarella, 1999). Beginning with Knowles’ (1975) theory of andragogy and Tough’s (1979) self-directed learning approach, adults foster the means to take ownership of their own learning. Brockett and Hiemstra’s (1991) expands on this with their Personal Responsibility Orientation (PRO) model. The idea here is that humans are “basically good” and have some “unlimited” amount of potential that needs improving. Learners then become active participants in their development, as if it was meant to be. Many, if not all, of

these works make assumptions of the learner upfront. Nevertheless, assumptions are a slippery slope in any army because they value facts and certainty.

McClusky's theory of margin helps inform this paper because it factors a person's life situation as well as their personal characteristics; more importantly, it introduces the motivation to learn and over time (Merriam & Caffarella, 1999, pp. 132–134). Simply put, some periods in life may better lend themselves to investing in learning, but why devote any time at all? Here is where motivation and learning come together. If people do not have some hard-wired drive to learn for the sake of learning, why do they? Self-determination theory helps explain this by expanding the idea of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations to learn (Deci, Olafsen, & Ryan, 2017). Intrinsic nods to Knowles and others work; that there exists some basic need to improve, while extrinsic reasons acknowledge the world actually live in. It is very likely that both exist simultaneously but along some continuum of self-desire and external-reward.

Other research provides a more holistic approach to self-development. These consider one's environment, the organization's values, and basic physiological needs (Sackett et al., 2016). The physical climate can also impact self-development (Knowles, 1975); while some participants took some advantage to learn in the war, most did not. Some research touches on technology and what that might mean in the future (Crowley et al., 2013; Livingstone, 2006). This will likely include artificial intelligence and some personalized learning agenda (Gagné, 2013, pp. 321–326). This makes sense since self-directed learning has a positive effect on the ability to learn, adapt and create (Beswick, Chuprina, Canipe, & Cox, 2002)—also a deep craving by senior Army leadership. Research suggests that the quantity and quality of self-development should be considered (Boyce et al., 2010, p. 175). Finally, many authors hint at or

directly admit what Spear's (1984) self-directed learning model concedes: that learning is largely nonlinear and full of starts and stops.

Since this research is on officer-leaders, understanding two accepted leadership types is important. The theory of transformational leaders was introduced by Bernard Bass in 1985, and these are the type leaders that most want to be—at least in the Army (Sabga, 2017). They influence others via motivation, exude integrity, and demonstrate true authenticity; they are bound by high values and are ever the optimist. They build consensus by valuing the input of the led, and they are apt to develop the same. It is no wonder there is research that supports a positive relationship between transformational leaders and adult learners (Sabga, 2017, pp. 86–87).

The other type of leader is transactional but should not be viewed as a bad leader or as any less likely to learn. These leaders enforce existing standards and adhere to set organizational goals. They motivate others extrinsically, focusing on rewards and or punishment. There is a time and place for both types of leaders, while Army officers will undoubtedly wield both as the situation dictates.

One final and widely accepted approach to learning is transformational. This loosely matches the ALDM's domains in that it consists of three main concepts: experience, critical reflection, and development. This last concept accepts many of the considerations mentioned with andragogy and self-directed learning earlier. Taken together, this “theory is about change – dramatic, fundamental change in the way we see ourselves and the world in which we live in” (Merriam & Caffarella, 1999, p. 318).

Most of the papers reviewed gave value to the importance of a consciousness or self-awareness in promoting self-development. One way to achieve this is via an assessment from

many vantage points. This is commonly known as a 360-degree evaluation or feedback system, where the learner self-evaluates and receives inputs from subordinates, peers, and bosses (McCarthy & Garavan, 1999, pp. 441–445). The U.S. military starting using a quasi-program as far back as World War I, and by the 1950s, businesses had introduced it to advanced their own leaders (Fleenor & Prince, 1997). Today, a 360-feedback tool in any profession is almost ubiquitous.

The instrument comes in many formats and is normally tailored for a specific purpose. Some organizations use this to, in part, rate the performance and productivity of workers. Others still might weigh personality and interpersonal skills (Adenuga, 1991). Most attempt to gather particular strengths and weaknesses in the employee, while the ultimate goal is to form some plan to sustain the strengths and improve on weaknesses. Once a learner is armed with this insight, the motivation to improve can be intrinsic or extrinsic (Reiss, 2009). In this author’s experience, the power of the evaluation was a dedicated plan, and here is where an “agent” can help. At a minimum, they can continuously monitor the plan and make real-time suggestions to improve. Once the improvement facts and strategy are known, it is harder to ignore, but some do.

Salient to this paper is one 2010 study that was done in concert with the Army Research Institute (ARI), “Propensity for self-development of leadership attributes: Understanding, predicting, and supporting performance of leader self-development” (Boyce et al., 2010). This research used 400 Army officers in the rank of captain during officer education in the institutional domain. In 2010, these officers would have joined the Army after 2001, and likely had about six to eight years of service.

Unlike most of the academic papers reviewed, this study took an empirical approach that examined the personal characteristics of learners as well as the organization’s support (the Army

in this research) (Boyce et al., 2010, p. 160). Figure 5 depicts five factors and 15 variables that contribute to self-development (left to right). The findings predict that individuals with ‘high work and mastery orientation were more motivated to perform self-development; while those with greater career-growth and mastery orientation, were more skilled.’ Career-growth orientation positively impacted both skills and the motivation to learn. There was low to no impact in achievement orientation and one’s cognitive ability, so no one has a reason not to try to self-develop.




Figure 5. Leader Development Personal Characteristics

When the role of the organization was analyzed, the study had a surprising result. In this case, the Army positively influenced leaders who had low or moderate levels of propensity to learn. Those with an already high propensity did not benefit but “actually reduced performance of self-development activities” (Boyce et al., 2010, p. 174). The paper proposes several plausible reasons for this result, but one they did not, is that the Army tends to cater to the median

population (sometimes called the “lowest common denominator” by soldiers). Figure 6 also demonstrates individual and organizational propensity to learn. This highlights the limits of what organizations can do, and puts greater emphasis on the ‘self’ in self-development.

This finding should be a significant marker for the Army as they consider gaps in the self-development domain. Improvements will require policy changes, which normally coincide with resources, and this literally means money. The organization will undoubtedly want to measure the cost and benefit, so Boyce et al.’s (2010) research should amplify that more resources will not evenly lead to more development. In fact, some point of diminishing returns is apt to happen.




Figure 6. Propensity for Self-development With and Without Organizational Support

Although rigorous, the paper does not develop what might be the most interesting finding. Because they were only concerned about those who performed self-development, they omitted the data from individuals with less than a 1.5 propensity measure (see red line on lower-left of figure 6). Based on their method and survey size(s), this would mean that between 8 and

26 percent of respondents simply did not take part in self-development.³ This is a big range, but even 8% of officers with six to eight years of service would be a sad finding and significant to senior Army leaders. The next section highlights what the Army's own research has discovered.

2.2 U.S. Army Literature and Some Practice

The Secretary of the Army may detail members of the Army as students... to enable them to acquire knowledge or experience in the specialties in which it is considered necessary that they perfect themselves.

At the broadest level, Army literature on self-development begins in the Constitution, and more specifically in the U.S. Code, Title X, Subtitle B, as stated above (1956).⁴ This methodically cascades down from the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Joint Staff via various directives, instructions, and policies. Interestingly, the DOD does not have one capstone leadership instruction source; rather, it demands that each service develop their own. They all have different covers and titles and are organized differently. However, at the core, each service essentially says the same about leadership—this includes aspects of self-directed learning and officer development. The main differences are mostly linked to their defense mission, leader environment (land, sea, air—and now, space), and unique service culture.

The Army's leadership references are organized from broad to detailed. These are derived from a series of policies, strategies, programs, and a long history.⁵ A good first source on leading is Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, "Army Leadership and the Profession." It establishes the "leadership requirement model," which essentially is what the Army wants its

³ The study confirms that they analyzed 130 respondents, but did not make it clear if that was from 177 or 141 eligible surveys. A 2013 and separate Army study revealed that 4% of officers perform no self-development.

⁴ <https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title10&edition=prelim>

⁵ And not simply in U.S. history. Service schools and senior reading lists routinely offer ageless biographies on leading—both good and bad.

leaders to “be, know and do” (see Appendix C) (DA, 2019, p. vii). The pie-shaped figure below (Figure 8) is a condensed version. The next and more lengthy publication is Field Manual (FM) 6-22, “Leader Development.” Even more details can be found in a series of Army Techniques and Procedures (ATP) manuals, which delves more into leader actions, historical vignettes, and examples for new leaders to learn from and maybe emulate.



Figure 7. Army Leadership Requirements Model

These ADPs, FMs, and ATPs are proven guides; think of them as what Army leadership *is* and ideas on improving specific attributes and competencies. Other Army references are more prescriptive, and in essence, direct soldiers and agencies what to *do*. One relevant document to this research is the Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 600-3, “Officer Professional Development and Career Management” (DA, 2017c). The short, 53 pages “describes the full spectrum of developmental opportunities an officer can expect throughout a career” (DA, 2017a, p. i). The Army Regulation (AR) 350-1, “Army Training and Leader Development,” expand this and is 254-pages (DA, 2014a). More documents include additional AR’s, teaching Program of Instructions (POI), and leader task lists. Beyond Army-wide sources, local installations and

commanders will also have policy, orders, and nuanced guidance on leadership development. Many will have a dedicated leadership development program (LDP)⁶ focused on the small unit and individuals (see Appendix E for an example at the battalion level). These documents and verbiage do not always nest perfectly since they are all developed, refined, and (re)published on a continuous basis (about 2–3 years). Still, they keep a common enough thread to be largely timeliness, minus some modern jargon. Revolutionary War General and President George Washington would understand the crux of the content.

Complementing and adding to all of these sources are web-based developmental guides, courses, case studies, videos, and etcetera (see Appendix F). Games and other artificial intelligence simulators are also gaining wide acceptance. One, in particular, attempts to capture an officer's development in one online place—Army Career Tracker (ACT). This web-portal consolidates training certificates, operational experience, and leading tasks from a series of other Army records. The picture it creates is as good as the technology needed to share the data and the officer's investment to review and interact with it. The portal offers many dedicated self-development resources based on the officer's time in service, job, education, and pure curiosity.

Another sought after developmental tool from the Army are “broadening assignments.”⁷ These can be a few weeks or several years. However, in essence, they physically take the leader away from their day-to-day experience and expertise. Examples include time with industry, academic immersion, or visiting other countries' military (with an accompanying culture

⁶ More specifically, they will break this down in to officer and NCO professional development programs (OPDs or NCOPDs).

⁷ Broadening Opportunity Program: See: <https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/Broadening%20Opportunity%20Programs%20Building%20a%20cohort%20of%20leaders%20that%20allow%20the%20Army%20to%20succeed%20at%20all%20levels%20in%20all%20environm%20ents>

immersion aspect). The problem with these is that it is tied to ever-fluctuating resources (they are expensive) and takes away from traditional “boots on the ground” development. The added value to the Army is also unknown, while senior leaders have different views of what broadening really means. The junior leader is caught in the middle because some Army leaders think it is a waste of time, and others superb. The result could jeopardize promotions or future assignments, so some officers might even eschew them.

In short, Army officers do not lack resources and opportunities to lead and better themselves or others around them. It might seem overwhelming, but the development, distribution, and integration into individual Army leaders is a choreographed affair. Below is a simple demonstrative figure, but understand that many thousands of soldiers and civilians, in hundreds of organizations, exist to get Army leadership development ‘right.’ Self-development is only one facet, and admittedly, it competes with other efforts (yellow highlight).




Figure 8. Army Leader Development Execution Model

Fostering leaders in the Army is meant “to develop a cognitive advantage through increased breadth and rigor of learning in the art and science of war, critical and creative thinking, and situational understanding” (DA, 2017a, p. 19). This is core to the “Army’s Leadership Development Strategy” (ALDS) (Chandler III, Odierno, & McHugh, 2013), which was recently enhanced by the October 2019 issued, “Army People Strategy.” The ALDM’s (Chapter 1, Figure 1) three-domains remains the most comprehensive view of this process; while the newer strategy wants to “increase the rigor” of learning but is short on details (Grinston et al., 2019b, p. 7). Specific to the self-development domain, the Army recognizes three types: structured, guided, and personal (DA, n.d., p. 3) (the types are also called formal, semiformal, and informal in various publications). It lists them in this order, consistent with the author’s experience in their value to the Army. The Army defines the focused research as:

Learning is a lifelong process. Institutional training and operational assignments alone do not ensure that Army officers attain and sustain the degree of competency needed to perform their varied missions. The profession of arms requires comprehensive self-study and training. Leaders must commit to a lifetime of professional and personal growth to stay at the cutting edge of their profession. They must keep pace with changing operational requirements, new technologies, common weapons platforms, and evolving doctrines. Every officer is responsible for his or her own self-development. (DA, 2019, p. 6)

As in academic literature, the Army begins with some assessment of weaknesses or shortcomings in the individual. These can be formal and administered by the Army and include physical fitness, technical knowledge, and even reading comprehension and writing ability. A more dedicated approach is the multi-source assessment and feedback (MSAF) program, an online 360-degree-assessment that includes observations and input from subordinates, peers, and superiors (to include the leader’s opinion and is found on the ACT portal). The areas of analysis are as diverse or pointed as the individual wants and are anonymous (DA, 2019, p. 6). The

program was mandatory since its inception in the early 1990s, but has become voluntary as recently at 2019 as mentioned earlier.

Armed with an external and self-assessment, the leader develops a plan. Good plans are reviewed by a superior officer (and or mentor) and have some time horizon with achievement benchmarks (or goals) and reassessments included. Bad plans are simply those that go unmade or not reviewed and or followed. Actions in the plan include professional reading, practice, writing, research, and even observation. Emulating those you respect is a worthy goal, while avoiding actions by perceived “bad” officers can be just as helpful.

In the author’s experience, and particularly in junior grades, superiors assigned reading and required quarterly book-reports. The officers in the organization often met to dissect famous battles, while each officer assumed the role of an influential leader and acted out the part they played in the battle (explaining why this or that was done, and why). This was admittedly semi-structured, but it required research on the person and the battle—it even forced many to find the installation library. How could one show up to play their part unprepared? Over time, military books like first-person accounts (“Heights of Courage”) were joined by deeper reading and strategy on the bookshelf (“Supplying War”). Other development tasks and goals facilitated hobbies, family-affairs, finances, public speaking, and personal conduct.

The Army clearly imagines these things are done on an officer’s own time, or what they would consider after, or off-duty hours [The humor here is that senior leaders will regularly remind officers that they are always on-duty, 24-7-365]. Admittedly, some of the officer’s goals (improved weaknesses) can be partially, if not wholly achieved, in the other two domains of the ALDM. Recall that the ‘personal’ type of self-development is listed third in documents, while

the Army own regulations want it to be first—or most important.⁸ The same can be said for how the ALDM is described and always in this order: institutional, organizational, and self-development. Although the Army states these have like importance, putting the ‘self’ last in words might add some unconscious bias. The domains (circles) in Figure 2 in Chapter 1 might better describe ALDM in practice.

From day one in the Army, an officer has at least 20 written publications and more than 30 web-based sources to improve themselves. They have many echelons of superior officers to help (Figure 16 in Chapter 4). Unfortunately, Army officers tend not to read their own doctrine as much as the Army would like (Pomper, 2004). The Army compensates for this by directing senior leaders to foster and guide junior ones, much like Brockett and Hiemstra’s (1991) Personal Responsibility Orientation model’s “educational agent” (p. 24). The Army’s “Leadership Development” manual puts it succinctly, “leaders must prepare themselves and act to promote long-term stewardship of the [profession]” (DA, 2015, p. 8), and “are responsible for ensuring their organizations develop subordinates” (pp. 1–2).

“Develops others” is one of the core leader competencies in the ADLM (see Figure 9 below and Appendix L). These, and associated publications, put the responsibility of subordinate self-development on superiors (normally senior in age and rank, but at least experience). The Army’s approach then is mostly an extrinsic affair to the individual. This is good in that it helps to navigate the vast array of materials available. However, it is flawed if senior leaders fail to undertake this task, or worse, are unable to because of a lack of experience from their own

⁸ “Integrating the fundamentals of leader development into the organization creates a positive, learning climate and builds a mindset among leaders that development is a priority” (DA, 2015, pp. 3–1).

journey. The 2013 Chief of Staff of the Army Leader Development Task Force had this recommendation (one of three) in their final report:

Developing others demands from the Army both an individual leader response, and an institutional response. Over the course of this war, the priority to send officers to teach and mentor in professional military education declined to meet operational demands.⁹ This practice must be reversed. If the Army indeed values developing others, then from an institutional perspective, the Army must do what it values and see to it that the very best officers are assigned to teaching and mentoring in professional military schools, and the pre-commissioning sources of West Point, ROTC, and OCS.

Admittedly, and from the author’s own experience in the Army of the 1990s, self-development was sort of a mystery for many years (but was lucky to have help along the way).




Figure 9. Develops Competency

The Army’s depiction is simple in that it bins these traits but admits in the literature that each one complements the other. A direct relationship between self-development and the 31 others exist, while “leads by example” demonstrates this: If senior leaders are seen reading professional magazines, juniors are more confident that they ‘practice what they preach.’ This, in turn, leads to greater trust between the leader and led. This should inspire the led and ultimately encourage greater self-discipline, organizational innovation, and a better overall ability to lead

⁹ This means that it did not meet the standards for war-time operations.

others. This, and other examples, are what the Army calls “setting a climate conducive to learning” (DA, 2015, p. 6-1), and is core to transformational leading from the last section.

Based on the leadership requirements and an officer’s duty,¹⁰ the core of Army self-development is, therefore, formal and semiformal types. Leadership development plans are an example of set goals and, ultimately, a gauge of improvement. Formal programs deliver knowledge at specific times and places, and normally on-duty; they provide context to materials, explaining how it improves the unit or the leader (normally both) (DA, 2015, p. 6-9). All of these things can be checked to ensure adherence to regulations. They also become one aspect of a supervisor’s annual evaluation of junior leaders. The motivation is there to excel in life-long development, as much as it is to excel in day-to-day requirements (this means it varies by individual). Academic literature would say that an Army’s means to motivate self-development is largely extrinsic. It is also clear that the Army is seeking some intrinsic motivation as well (DA, 2019, pp. 1–6).

The Army approach to personal or informal development is to extoll the benefits of traditional mentoring which, “Focuses primarily on the mentee, examining the career path through goal setting, with the overall development of the individual as the focus. This mentoring is a process where the mentor and mentee join by their own volition” (DA, 2015, pp. 3–18). It clearly exists “to assist the lesser-experienced person” which is inexorably tied to the Army’s rank structure (DA, 2019, p. 2). The Army also accepts and promotes peer mentoring and the important role that subordinates with experience play in developing junior officers (many times

¹⁰ Duty in the Army is, “to do what is right to the best of their ability” (DA, p. 2-2). This is central to the research question: Even if we assume officers are committed to duty, their ‘ability’ to deliver remains in question. If you have never seen an ‘educational agent’ in action, could you emulate it?

senior NCOs). Some local mentoring programs have a bit of formality by listing names, but the best is likely those fostered over the years, ranks and miles.

Mentoring then is the Army's means to encourage the true self in self-development. Officer's accept their shortcomings and take actions above and beyond formal ways to improve themselves. Consider this a self-awareness of how they fit in the larger organization, and how if they grow, so does the unit, or conversely if they are not up to the challenge. Couple this with some self-discipline and a savvy mentor guiding the learning and the result can deliver on the life-long and intrinsic quality the Army seeks (needs). Admittedly, officers entering service have various levels of curiosity and intrinsic motivation to be better. This is where the special and often frank discourse between a mentor and mentee adds immeasurably to leader development. When officers receive awards or other accolades, they will undoubtedly thank their subordinates who do the work, the boss because they are there, and their mentors along the way—sometimes by name (family and spouses too).

Below is a model of what “right” might look like for an Army officer leader career (Figure 10, developed by the author). The vertical gauge (right) is admittedly some guess on self-development, while a leader's entry point into the military (left) is broad and with varying degrees of individual motivation. Still, it is known that age and schooling (maturity in the model) correlate to participation in adult education (Merriam & Caffarella, 1999, p. 55), so one should expect with certainty that self-development has a positive slope over the years.

The shown plateau is not intended to end self-development; rather, it acknowledges Grow's (1991) most advanced and final stage of self-learning. Variables for soldiers also include programed periods of professional training, academic and degree awarding opportunities (BA/BA, MA/MS), as well as ever increasing positions of responsibility. These are represented

as the small and positive steps on the gauge. Add to the model the Army’s hope that mentoring has some exponential impact on an individual’s proclivity to seek self-development. This paper cannot parcel-out the types of learning, but it is likely a mix of goal, activity and learning-oriented development are at play (Merriam & Caffarella, 1999. p. 64).




Figure 10. Metaphorical Representation of Self-development

2.3 Army Research and Self-Development

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Army has studied aspects of and the proclivity to participate in self-development via the Center for Army Leadership’s “Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL): Army Education” studies. This longitudinal study began in 2010 and stopped in 2017, although the Army continues to garner similar leadership research via other surveys. The unfortunate truth is, these and some of the results below are simply not read by most officers. Even senior officials will most likely get a short summary or 20-minute briefing. It might even be why the Army consistently discovers the same results and posits similar recommendations each decade or so.

The CASAL results suggest that Army officers overall value self-development, but this has ebbed and flowed (Figure 11). The negative slope from 2010 to 2013 is telling and described in the paper’s introduction. That this trend has slightly reversed might seem good. However, if

officers have less and less appreciation for what self-development actually is, their self-assessments could be wrong. The Army’s take on the problem was consistent throughout the years, “A persistent challenge with self-development is available time. Since self-development is primarily an activity at the discretion and initiative of the individual leader, it is easily set aside or delayed when other demands compete for leaders’ time. It is not surprising that only about half of leaders report having sufficient time for self-development in their current assignment, while one-third indicate they do not have time” (Riley et al., 2016, p. 78) (more discussion of time and Army officers is continued below).




Figure 11. ALDM Domain Effectiveness, 2010–2016

A comprehensive 2013 RAND study called for “major” changes to the overall ATLD processes via a more structured approach (Crowley et al., 2013). Many of the recommendations included better understanding what sort of leaders are needed in the future as well as improved analytics and ways to measure current development efforts. Unsurprisingly, it calls for more resources too. The research acknowledges the self-domain but is largely mute on how it fits in

the larger process, while the impact of mentoring is not addressed. This is, perhaps, because measuring self-development is hard, but not impossible.

The 2013 CSA report, introduced in Chapter 1, had more concrete things to say concerning self-development (Adamshick, 2013). One of three recommendations concluded that the Army needed to “dramatically” improve the culture regarding leader involvement in developing others (Adamshick, 2013, p. vi). The narrative below sums up the CASAL findings over the years:

Only one-third of leaders rate the developmental counseling they receive from their immediate superior as having a large or great impact on their development. Further, nearly one-in-five indicate they never or almost never receive formal or informal performance counseling. Leaders report that the primary reasons why counseling does not occur as it is supposed to, or when it is supposed to, are because leaders are not held accountable when it does not occur and that leaders do not have (or take) the time to do it.

A 2016 ARI study on producing strategic thinking and skills for the Army echoes call for self-development (Sackett et al., 2016). It also admits a lack of focus, and that the lacking resource might simply be time as mentioned throughout (Sackett et al., 2016): Enhancing the Strategic Capability of the Army: An Investigation of Strategic Thinking Tasks, Skills, and Development

Self-development is another area that is key to developing strategic thinking ability. Many participants discussed the importance of self-development in strategic thinking development, which is in part due to a deficiency of strategic thinking developmental opportunities elsewhere. In addition, the current Army culture prioritizes other activities above strategic thinking development at this time, putting more responsibility on Army leaders to develop strategic thinking [key skills and attributes] on their own time. Therefore, to increase strategic thinking ability, more self-development opportunities could be developed and disseminated across the Army.

Other studies of military leaders indicate that more than half realize they do not (or cannot) dedicate proper attention to self-development (Crowley et al., 2013). Voids like these are not filled quickly since it takes decades of education, training, and nurturing to allow peak leader

self-development (Thomas, 2006). These seasoned leaders should cultivate the same climate in junior and mid-grade soldiers, or as the Army says, “promote long-term stewardship of the [profession]” (DA, 2015). While many in uniform might agree with this, research sadly supports that the effect of self-development is very little (Chung, 2011). This portends action on behalf of the Army, which is already underway. The Center for Army Leadership, at their War College in Carlisle, PA, is drafting a paper called, “Educating for Thinking Strategically: Building Capacity across the Force (2020–2040)” (*Educating for thinking strategically: Building capacity across the Force (2020-2040)*, n.d.) to focus Army efforts (based on research from the Army Research Institute (Sackett et al., 2016)).

Army leaders will have their work cut out for them. The most recent RAND study on Army time-management indicates that lieutenants and captains are working “an average of 12.5-hour workdays,” which leaves for little else (Saum-Manning et al., 2019). The study found that these officers spent three percent of their time in a quarter on self-development. Perhaps more telling is that six percent of the population consider development “non-mission-essential.” The impact on self-development is obvious, but the result of overburdened leaders is the exact opposite of the goals in the ALDM. The study found that “soldiers may resort to lying, misrepresenting the truth, or seemingly tasking themselves and their subordinates beyond the limits of productivity and effectiveness” (Saum-Manning et al., 2019, p. xi).

There is an obvious wealth of academic literature on adult learning, so much so, it can be a bit overwhelming. It seems every aspect of self-development has a theory, but these can be narrowed down to a shorter, widely-accepted, and accessible list of research. The same cannot be said of the Army. As mentioned, the Army does research itself. However, in relation to self-development, one can only expect new literature every other year, and access to raw data is

mysterious or time-consuming at best. The Army's doctrinal references are numerous and there is a clear evidence that its self-development domain has been informed by academics. If soldiers take the time to read these, they will be exposed to proven methods.

The next chapter is the paper's methodology. It reminds the reader of the research question, introduces the population and how the data was requested and collected. The chapter closes by explaining the many procedures used and how these were assembled to meet scientific rigor.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

This research aims to better understand how 19 years of war has impacted the Army's self-development domain. This required getting a sense of what happened well before the wars and today. Since the Army extensively studies itself quantitatively, and mainly via survey's, a grounded theory approach would better capture the period's phenomenon from another vantage—literally hearing what Army leaders say and do concerning self-development. The research's impact identified what the Army is doing well; but more importantly, what it is doing poorly or not at all. The initial goal of the work was to develop a new theory about war and its influence on the Army's self-development domain, but that was not to be.

3.1 Research Question

The pointed research question is: How have 19 years of war impacted the U.S. Army's leader self-development today? More broadly, the research can shed light on this influence on Army leaders in the near future. There were supporting questions too: How did Army officer-leaders describe their perception of self-development as a value to themselves; what were the perceptions of Army officer-leaders concerning the long-term value of self-development for the Army; and how did leaders foster self-development attributes in those around them ('develop others' in Army speak)? In essence, and besides being told to do so, what made officers engage in self-development and when? Appendix D has a complete list of the questions used during the interviews.

3.2 Methodology

In the researcher's experience, and in talking with many officers about the Global War on Terror (mainly the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters, but there are others), a common theme comes up: 'There was no time for anything, but getting ready, fighting and resetting to begin again.' It is convenient to say and largely agreed with, but is it true? The daily-weekly-monthly tempo was undoubtedly demanding and hyper-focused on war-related tasks, but no one is certain about the impact of this on self-development. As highlighted in Chapter 2, the Army knew self-development application dipped throughout the early 2000s compared with previous years, but it never revealed why in any detail. Researchers then guessed that time was likely the cause, but this research wanted to discover something new.

Grounded theory was chosen for this research to tease out more than a Likert scale could deliver. It aimed to hear soldiers tell their experiences before, during, and after¹¹ the war as it related to self-development and learning. Unlike a snap-shot in time annual survey, grounded theory allowed a picture to develop over a longer period (Creswell & Poth, 2016, pp. 82–84). The research leaned on Strauss and Corbin's systematic procedure to help form a broader theory about the impact of war on self-development (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Specifically, this method compared time periods and actions, leader's unique language to describe their thoughts, and a modicum of the researcher's own personal experience.

The methodology did evolve over time and is described in sections 3.6 and 3.7. The original design was very objective and process oriented. After several interviews and the associated analysis, it became clear that the participants had significantly different army experiences and exposure to the war. Without really knowing at the time, the data collected and

¹¹ The wars are not over in 2020, but the tempo and the number of soldier's deployed is vastly less.

the results more closely related to Charmaz's (2008) constructionist approach to grounded theory, which is less focused on a theory outcome, and more on "responding to emergent questions, new insights, and further information and simultaneously constructing the method of analysis" (pp. 402–403). After reading a paper by Anthony Bryant, it was clear that the research was not a purist's ground theory, but important nonetheless (Bryant, 2002).

3.3 The Researcher

There was an aspect of ethnography in this study, since the researcher served as an Army officer for 20 years and still works in and around the population—32 total years (Creswell & Poth, 2016, pp. 75–82). Admittedly, this could have introduced a bias toward his own experience, but procedures emerged to limit this to the maximum amount (described below). It also positively supported the relationship between the participants and the researcher (Charmaz, 2008). There were advantages to having a former officer conduct the research since the Army has a unique culture, vocabulary, and structure that could easily frustrate another. Non-military researchers could certainly choose this method but need to be aware that valuable time might be needed to learn Army lingo and its vast (sometimes boring) literature.

The researcher is a retired Armor officer (think of tanks), and spent half of his service training for and conducting combat operations. This included deployments and other "muddy boot" experiences. The other half was spent in the institutional domain of the Army, not only as a student, but as an instructor. The researcher developed leaders in the Army's Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) for six years. First, at the University of Tampa in Florida, and later at The Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland. This experience is rather unique in the Army, but provided expert knowledge of leadership and learning development—even an

assistant professor of the year award. This, and a passion for improving himself, added to the rigor of the analysis and the work.

3.4 Study Participants

To narrow the research, only Army officer leaders that began their service prior to 1994¹² were asked to participate. This particular year would afford leaders at least ten years of service prior to their war experiences and during the war itself. This is also close to when most officers are promoted to the rank of major, which is an Army established benchmark for “senior” status (also known as, “field-grade” this roughly coincides with the tenth year of service, which became a salient part of the analysis in the next chapter). By this time, many have also received advanced degrees in varying disciplines as well. Participants were still in active service and in the ranks of lieutenant colonel, colonel, and general.

There are roughly 75,000 officers from the active Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard, but only active-duty officers were selected. Based on the researcher’s experience, the study will assume that the impact to active duty officers is more acute than their reserve counterparts. This was due largely to a higher tempo of deployments but does not rule out some important influences in the reserves (active soldiers deployed on a roughly 1:1 ratio, versus reserves that were 1:3-1:5). There are also Army civilian leaders that have similar self-development goals, but this study was only concerned with uniformed responses. Another option, but not used, included interviewing retired officers, but only those that recently left the ranks.

¹² Three YG 1996 officers were interviewed, but they also had five and six years of enlisted service. The researchers knew them well and greatly respected their experiences and insight.

The recorded demographics of this population were gender, time in service, rank, and branch. An officer's branch is their specialty in the service. These include "combat" soldiers, but also logisticians, transportation, medical, signal, etcetera leaders. This was an important consideration since every branch tends to have its own subculture that may impact self-development. Their commissioning source (ROTC, USMA, or OCS), or how they became an officer was also collected. A summary table is below.

Table 1. Select Demographics

Rank	Source	Year Group	Gender	Branch
General – 2	USMA – 4	1985 – 2	Male – 15	General – 2
Colonel – 12	ROTC – 12	1990 – 4		Armor – 3
LTC – 3	OCS – 1	1991 – 3	Female – 2	Ordnance – 2
		1992 – 2		Infantry – 2
		1993 – 3		Quarter Master – 2
		1994 – 1		Chemical – 2
		1996 – 3		Military Intelligence – 1
				Foreign Area Officer – 1
				Nuclear Operations – 1
				Strategist – 1

3.5 Data Collection

Prior to collecting data, the researcher sought and was granted exempt status by the University of South Florida Institutional Review Board (see Appendix B). Based on prior coursework on interviewing and reflecting with his committee, the researcher developed a series of questions and anticipated probing questions for the volunteer participants (see Appendix D). One pilot interview was conducted, although prior interviews were very similar to the final and refined questions in this research.

Figure 12 was a basic way of depicting the interview questioning strategy used, and is adapted from Creswell and Poth's (2016) recommended categories (sensitizing, theoretical,

practical, and guiding) (pp. 70–71). The “baseline” (1) are those questions that might capture the participant’s general knowledge of the Army’s ALDM. After this, questions began to expose their experiences before 2001 (2. Before), and then asked them to highlight what they practiced today (“after” or 3). Several pointed questions about the “during” (4) period better exposed gaps between before and after (or not in some cases). The researcher expected and received a healthy amount of “reflection” (5) throughout the interviews. Therefore, few probing questions were needed for most participants. These might be commonly referred to as “Army stories,” and they added to the overall fabric of analysis.




Figure 12. Questioning Strategy

An email invitation was sent to officer’s the researcher knew personally. The short note asked them to participate in the study, and an informed consent letter was included. It also asked them if they knew others that might be willing to contribute. This, and back-and-forth emails established a time and place to conduct the interview. Only three interviews were done in person because the world was convulsing in the COVID-19 pandemic. The remainder were done by phone, which impeded physical data observations. Every email sent received a response, and half returned with others that might be willing to participate. Female participation was a challenge, but this was likely due to their relative population size in senior positions (the total Army is roughly 15-17% female, which is up from 9% in 1980). Even so, and in the researcher’s experience, Army leadership and learning are gender neutral.

Creswell and Poth's (2018) Chapter 7, "Data Collection," guided the next steps. The phone and in-person interviews were conducted the same. After receiving a verbal acceptance to participate, a voice recorder was turned on, and the interviews averaged 24 minutes (total hours were 6.83). The researcher kept notes on the leader's tone and other comments to probe. On three occasions, senior participants asked that the recorder to be turned off so they could be brutally frank. Notes from these events were disparaging but valuable to the research. The audio file was then loaded onto a computer and sent to a fee-based online transcription service (rev.com). A file naming convention made the participants anonymous, and only first names or "sir / ma'am" were used during the questioning. The recorded audio file was deleted on the recorder, and the original MP4 file was saved on an encrypted hard drive along with the transcribed content. The researcher also kept handwritten notes and memos, which remain secure. Lastly, a "thank you" email was sent to each leader along with a working paper on self-development.

3.6 Procedures

The interview questions remained the same for all participants (see Appendix D). After four interviews, the researcher started coding the transcripts using NVivo 12 software. The fidelity of the transcript was at least 99% accurate, and only Army jargon and acronyms were wrong, but decipherable. The first-order coding was very broad, and the only patterns that surfaced were mostly complaints about time for self-development and negative comments about the institution (Saldaña, 2015, pp. 115–159). This, and relistening to the interviews, refined how the questions were asked, the order in some cases, and added detail to the probing inquiries. Interviewing and coding continued in a similar way until participant 15. A more detailed second coding effort refined 86 codes and 31 clear categories came to light with the help of memos kept

throughout (and random post-it notes when thoughts came). Two additional interviews fit the categories and themes nearly perfectly and helped convince the researcher that data saturation had been met. More analysis further refined the number of categories down to eight.

During the interviews, the participant often asked questions or made wrong or dated statements about Army doctrine. Notes were kept, and only after the recorder was turned off did the researcher answer questions or provide more accurate information.

3.7 Data Analysis

The data were transcripts, voice recordings, research notes, and memos. Open coding initially provided very little insight, but many codes (86). As more interviews and codes were added, relations¹³ were formed, and categories began to emerge. With the help of NVivo software, it was fairly easy to bin codes into bunches and refine these into broader themes. After going back through each transcript, additional remarks that were overlooked found a place and added to the legitimacy of a category (Saldaña, 2015, pp. 235–263). This selective coding added immensely to the analysis, but it also highlighted a limitation of the software or the researcher's familiarity with it.

Draft themes were already forming at this step and were captured in memos, which were used later. After attempting to manipulate the software to capture or “see” the codes and categories connections, the researcher defaulted to a more comfortable approach using Word tables. This additional step added yet another layer of accuracy in that it forced additional code reviews and their assigned category. Approximately 10% were reshuffled, and a few were

¹³ The whole process reminded the author of his military studies, specifically those of Moa Tse-Tung's 1930 work that espoused numerous and importance of relations.

removed, but it also created an entirely new category when the more familiar Word version was finished (Creswell & Poth, 2018, pp. 189–197). Figure 13 depicts how this came together.




Figure 13. Theme Creation

Throughout the analysis, the literature review guided the ‘bins’ and validated previous research on adult learning. It also uncovered potential flaws in the Army’s current survey approach, which is discussed in the conclusion. The questioning model in Figure 12 also allowed some temporal analysis that clearly demonstrated leaders maturing and reflecting on past lapses in self-development.

Negating the researcher's own bias was always a front-of-mind concern. During each interview, a conscious and successful effort was made not to judge the answers at the time, but rather to capture what was said and ask only clarifying questions. The transcripts became a phrase-by-phrase exercise of coding, in that it was what they said, and left the meaning behind. Soon the categories seemed to fill naturally and without judgment. If there was ever a question of not using some piece, the researcher created a "dunno" code—or a depository that was visited and used later (only five remained out of 92).

3.8 Summary

Ground theory, albeit modified, allowed a scientific approach to capture the impact of war and self-development, which are highlighted in the next two chapters. The methodology outlined in this chapter demonstrates that the collective experiences of select senior leaders can increase the understanding of the Army's self-development state today and beyond. The coding and recoding were time-consuming, but the constant churn of these made several clear findings. It also highlighted some unanticipated but connected Army phenomena that were not associated with the research question. Although the Army does longitudinal studies that compares leader cohorts over their career, there is value in asking individual soldiers to reflect on their early years, significant milestones and now.

CHAPTER FOUR:

RESULTS

You can tell who is doing the self-development and who is not just by what they bring to the table on a daily basis... (Officer comment)

Army leaders like the bottom line up-front, or BLUF; and its officers can be blunt, without much time needed to think. So, when asked, “Figuratively speaking, do you think the Army’s putting its money where its mouth is insofar as self-development?” they did not disappoint. Figure 14 is a record of their reactions, and it serves as the introduction to the results of this research. Even when leaders tried to give credit to the organization, it was not always done with zeal. The “no” soldiers were not only quick to answer, but they made it with an ardent tone. This tone became a common denominator during questioning, which illustrates the passion most of these leaders have.

Negative Comments	Positive Comments
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• No, I think the Army hasn't done enough...• No, absolutely not• No• No, I don't• No• No... no, I don't• I really don't think so• The Army is trying to get better• Seems almost non-existent• There's a lot we could do to improve• I think the jury is out - I think they are getting there• Sometimes I'm not even sure what we're talking about• If that's a three-legged stool, that's the short leg• It's doing the best it can	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• I think the Army does a great job• Yeah, I mean, I would agree• I don't know, I think they are• It's literally doing the best it can• The army definitely puts its money where its mouth is• I can't imagine another organization that puts its money where its mouth is better than the Army• ...the Army's truly put their money where their mouth is with regard to [SD]

Figure 14. Immediate Reactions to a Pointed Question

This chapter starts with some findings of officer populations over the past several decades. This is important because self-development concerns people, but in the case of the Army, it is a whole domain—a collective of improving not only yourself, but those around you, and over time. This primer should be kept in mind over the next sections. These describe the categories and themes derived from grounded theory (see Appendix J for a consolidated list of additional samples). They are organized for scholarly consumption, but in reality, they are dynamic. One theme impacts another, and depending on the officer time in service, some influence more and others less. The results answer some finite questions but often create more open-ended puzzles that need dedicated study. The analysis section answers the research question, while the final section offers a theory-primer about war and self-development in general.

4.1 Officer Populations

This research focused on the war period, and although not over, the tempo of deployment, casualties, and cost is greatly reduced. Unlike the Army surveys during the height of the war-period, looking back provided some useful insights. In-between interviewing and coding, the researcher gathered other data that might help answer the research question and develop a theory or more. Some were irrelevant, other bits not used intentionally, but officer grade populations delivered clear evidence.

The Army's end-strength, as dictated by Congress, historically grows and shrinks which is nothing new. But if you consider this study's focus, a 21.5% growth in 13 years is more than interesting. What is also telling is the impact of the 1990s RIF mentioned in Chapter 1. This reduced the officer corps from 89,599 in 1990 to the low in the author developed Figure 15, or

64,878—a 27.4% reduction in just 11 years. This roller-coaster occurred in what is a typical careerist officers’ time in service (roughly 26 years).




Figure 15. Officer Population Decline and Growth, 1990-2016

More results come when the populations are broken out by grade, as seen in Figure 16. The majority of the growth was in lieutenants and captains (33.5%), while the rest of the more senior grades grew by only 18.2% on average. This makes sense in that you cannot simply inject a major or colonel into the force.¹⁴ Leaders must be “grown” from induction and junior grades to experienced and savvy leader-warriors.

To create growth in these advanced ranks is a deliberate Army decision to retain and promote officers that would have otherwise been discharged for a relative lack of demonstrated leadership. This is also known as “up or out.”¹⁵ Many that simply desire ‘out’ may be told to stay via “involuntary continuation” or offered financial or education incentives to stay. Growing

¹⁴ There is a process that allows direct commissioning in senior grades for special skills and mostly from the medical and highly technical fields.

¹⁵ The flipside to ‘up or out’ during a RIF is that quality leaders that should be promoted, are told to get out. It is not only demoralizing for those remaining, but is inefficient and financially costly.

young and junior officers’ uses some of these same strategies but include others. An army in need often provides incentives to join, and from Chapter 2, it lowers the commissioning standards to join. When the need is greatest, the Army may also relax age limits to serve and look past criminal history to join.




Figure 16. Grade Population Growth, 1994–2016

Population growth in this period alone is significant, while one could argue the impact of the methods used. When one more layer is revealed, regardless of growth or reduction, lieutenants and captains in Figure 17 were 61% of the corps in 2013. These leaders are the most junior, least experienced, and have served for the shortest time. In 2013, this officer cohort only knew an army at war (see section 4.2.8 and Figure 21 to see what the corps’ population looked like graphically). Unsurprisingly, they were the ones most in need of any and all development. In 2020, they have either left the force or attained the rank of major, while most are junior colonels. They have become the cadre the Army expects will foster the next officer generation. The sections below describe how they might have been short-changed by a very long war, and little to no exposure to self-development.




Figure 17. Aggregate Officer Population

4.2 Themes

Chapter 3 highlighted the process of narrowing codes to eventual themes. The table of distinguishable categories below is a summary based on experience and the methodology. Categories like “It is a problem” and “It is a problem today” might sound as though they should be grouped alike, but there are acceptable, albeit finite differences in the two. The same can be said about “Mentoring” and “Lack of mentoring.” Consider these the same coin, but with different sides and stories to tell and in-line with the “flip-flop technique” in the literature (Corbin, & Strauss, 2008, pp. 76–77). The next eight sections describe these finding. Some are directly related to the war, while others deliver a larger critique of the domain in question.

Categories	
Leader confusion / frustration	Mentoring
Leader blames the army	Lack of mentoring
It is a problem	360
Importance of educational agents	Counsel
It is a problem today	Anti-intellectual
Lack of educational agents	Competition
War	Spark
External distractions	Peers
No time to reflect	Duty
Priority	Expectation
Operational	Develop others
Institutional	Reflecting on past
Reading	Didn't get it
Experience	Reward / Incentive
OPD / LPD	Curiosity
	Care or Self-disciplined

Figure 18. Distinguishable Categories

4.2.1 Institutional Responsibility

Table 2. Categories Leading to an Army Problem

Code Examples	Categories
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • With self-development... sometimes I'm not even sure what we're talking about • There's a mismatch between the intent of self-development and the desired outcome of self-development • There is a misconception among the force in terms of what leader development as a whole means • Well, how is it being measured? 	Leader confusion / frustration
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I have heard leader development and self-development for over a decade... and I have not seen an emphasis put on it other than in words • The Army says a lot of things are important and sometimes they follow through and sometimes they don't [referring to SD] • Telling us to do self-development without providing the resources such as time or opportunities is somewhat hypocritical 	Leader blames the Army
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A challenge for us institutionally is self-development • I think that we do a pretty much of a hand wave over self-development • The first thing that goes overboard is self-development • There's a lot we could do to improve 	It is a problem

Officers clearly put the onus of self-development on the Army's shoulders, whether giving it a positive or negative grade (Table 3). The vast majority of comments graded it poorly and acknowledged that a lack of self-development was indeed "a problem" for the institution and individuals. Leaders were frustrated, and some of this can be found in the Army's own literature. As mentioned in Chapter 2 the Army says, "Every officer is responsible for his or her own self-development" (DA, 2019, p. 6); but in others, it ascribed the importance of "Developing Others." This should not be a huge leap, but it was.

More than frustrated, the officers interviewed had an overall poor understanding of the Army's expectations, even if they were fully engaged in life-long learning and mentoring juniors. Their confusion stems from missing this important Army principle, "Leader development is cooperative and holistic. The individual officer, unit commanders, mentors, and Army educational institutions all share in the responsibility for developing leaders at every level" (DA, 2019, p. 6). Studies reveal that the Army asks leaders to self-report their understanding of self-development, and this has recently been on a positive trend. What if, as mentioned in the introduction and now described here, officer's appreciation level and understanding is small? The result is an army that does not know itself, and a lesson learned at least 2,500 years ago by Sun Tzu (emphasis added).

He who knows the enemy and himself,
Will never in a hundred battles be at risk;
He who does not know the enemy, but knows himself
Will sometimes win and sometimes lose;
*He who knows neither the enemy nor himself
Will be at risk in every battle* (Ames, 2010, p. 113)

When pushed to defend their own self-development, many complained of no time (more on this in section 4.2.3), a lack of priority (section 4.2.4), and surprisingly, a lack of resources. In reality, the Army has an exhausting cache of resources (see Appendix F). This officer's

assessment surmises this theme, “If the Army doesn't make it easy to do the right thing, we're not going to do it.” This harkens back to what seems to be a now old Army quip, ‘do the hard-right over the easy-wrong.’ Still, this officer’s candor might ring true today. Perhaps the Army has the wrong resources? Or maybe they are inaccessible and simply too many to digest?

4.2.2 Educational Agents

Mentors, peers, educators, bosses, and family were all examples of self-development support provided by officers. This should not be a surprise and validates Brockett and Hiemstra’s (1991) Personal Responsibility Orientation, which describes the importance of “an educational agent” (p. 24). For all of the accolades to agents, “There's no doubt in my mind, I would not be where I am today, if not for [my mentor]”, there were the same number that described a lack of them, “I never really experienced a mentor. I read about it, heard about it, and never really felt like I ever had [one].” Table 4 demonstrates that leaders are aware of the problem, which is both good and bad.

Table 3. Lack of Educational Agents

Code Examples	Category
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We don't tell them what that self-development looks like, other than to say work on your weaknesses • There is a good core of people who can do it... [and] there are people who are not doing it at all... some of it is because they're unable personally • If you don't point them in the right direction or give them a starting point or set conditions for self-development to happen, it probably won't • Just by mathematics there's less people there to codify and develop the profession's technical knowledge. As that gets eroded and by extension you're going to see a degradation of what the standard is for professional development 	Lack of educational agents

Growing the Army’s future leaders has always relied on formal and informal relations with leaders around them. The group of officers interviewed challenged this notion in today’s circumstances. Some bemoaned a generation gap, but when has the Army not had one. Again,

others pointed to a lack of time, but some hinted that they recognized some leaders that are simply incapable, “There is a good core of people who can do it... [other] people who are not doing it at all... some of it is because they're unable personally” (Officer comment). This was probably true in the past, but is it more prevalent today?

4.2.3 Little Time

This researcher has likely said, “I don’t have time” many thousands of times in his uniformed days (and still does). In relation to the war-period and self-development, every officer mentioned the time premium when deploying was discussed. This comment summarizes the impediments to adult learning during war, “I can do it in three words. Lack of time.” This researcher can attest that war is particularly time-consuming. Still, there was learning going on, but it was not the sort of life-long and emancipating type the Army wants and needs. The academic literature in Chapter 2 supports this if you consider the physical climate and environment of a battlefield. When pushed on any self-development during high tempo times, this was a common answer, “There wasn’t any self-development going on, brother.” If colloquial words were ignored, ‘time’ was the most common term in all interviews.

Some officers couched the idea of physical time by explaining other Army priorities and external distractions, “I’ve got a working wife and 4 kids, so most of my time is taken up by them.” This is fair, but others in the same situation over the decades were able to engage in development. Defining priorities and individual leader motivations is discussed below. Recall that leader development remained an Army priority during the war, at least by policy and regulation. But when there truly is no time left, “The first thing that goes overboard is self-development” (Officer comment).

Out of curiosity, how much time does a soldier have today, and not in a war-setting? This has evolved over time, and Figure 19 is by no means every leader. The BLUF is 103 days off, 210 working or on duty (10 hours / day, but many do more like the reported 12.5 hours in Chapter 2), and around 122 sleeping (8 hours / night). What has changed is that soldiers are not around one another as often as they were in the 1990s. If deployed, the opposite was true, but meaningful conversations are hard to have when dodging incoming rockets. Eleven days of no scheduled activity, or DONSA, is recent in the past 15 years and is basically a day off. While some units do train on the weekends today, it is the exception rather than the rule—rare even. With less time around others, are officers missing mentoring opportunities? Conversely, with more time off, you would think there would be more time for self-development as the Army envisions it. The on-line social media explosion is probably another factor impacting time and priorities.




Figure 19. Soldier’s Time in Hours

4.2.4 Competing Domains

The ALDM has three domains, as described in Chapter 1. Figure 2 was introduced there as a hunch, but now it is confirmed. Officers describe a crushing amount of exposure to the operational domain—particularly during the highest war-tempo periods, “I get up early, come

home late and rely really on my operational experiences to provide the most of my development as an officer” (Officer comment). There is no surprise here—just a fact for most, as seen in Table 5.




Figure 2 (Repeated). Author’s Perception of the ALDM

Table 4. Operational Domain Code Examples

Code Examples	Category
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Haven't had the time between family and operational assignments and deployments • OPTEMPO when I was in operational units was so hard or fast that there was really almost no opportunities for self-development • For guys that are running with the operational army to have a meaningful outside of your work day, self-development effort • They certainly put their money where their mouth is operationally • You can't entrust [SD] to the senior rater or the rater cause all they're focused on is maximizing the value of that officer for the good of the operational assignment they're in den • We were so busy just focused on doing our mission 	Operational Domain

Overall, the institutional domain was applauded for knowledge gained and was often a catalyst for greater self-development (see section 4.2.7). This author recalls one history professor that wrote three-times worth of corrections to the five-page assignment. On meeting to discuss this, she pointedly said, ‘your grasp of English is horrific and you need to fix this in the next six

months!' Although a work in progress, I heeded the critique and checked out some grammar books from the library. Like the officers interviewed, this was one of many self-development intercepts. Some officers describe the impact of this domain as fleeting, "The institutional domain's like going to the gym every day. And then all of a sudden, once you leave the institutional domain, you stop going to the gym" (Officer comment).

When the war-period and the institutional domain are singled out, the support for leader development was clearly poor. Some described missed chances for school, but others were more animated, "When it was their time to be developed, we sent them to Iraq and Afghanistan instead of learning how to attack." One very senior officer admitted, "Then of course cost, we reduced the number of courses available, we changed instructor-student ratio. You go from small group, collegiate level discussion and interaction to one over the world, large group instruction" (Officer comment).

4.2.5 What's Not Working

This theme is obviously tied closely to the next: What Works. In most cases, a lack of what works is what is not working. For example, a lack of mentoring erodes self-development, while having mentors greatly expands it. A lack of mentors surprised this researcher, who was fortunate to have many over the years. By far, answers to questions about mentoring followed this theme, "Oh, mentors. That's a sore subject for me. I did not have any mentors in my basic branch" (Officer comment). The 'basic branch' referred to is lengthy to explain, but in short, he had none for about the first ten years. The table below is a third of the disparaging comments on mentoring in the Army.

Table 5. Lack of Mentoring

Code Examples	Category
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• You have other leaders who maybe were never mentored themselves or never really fully grasped it... it just wasn't within their personality profile to be a good mentor• I personally don't have anyone that I call a mentor• Mentor? No. None. That was pretty easy• There's no particular leader of mine, company commanders, field grades, anything like that, that encouraged [me]• No, and it's been that way my entire career• I've got to admit, especially when I was a junior officer, I never really experienced a "mentor." I read about it, heard about it, and never really felt like I ever had a formal mentor per se• I just didn't experience it [mentoring] myself at an early age• Mentorships one of these things the army's always talked about [he then went on to eviscerate it]	Lack of mentoring

The notion of a '10-year' mark came up over and over, "I don't think I really got my act together until I was about 10 years into the Army..." But for many, this was about the start of the war or a few years earlier. Is this first decade wasted insofar as self-development? Or just another and less advanced form similar to Grow's (1991) self-directed learning levels? Half of the officers admitted at one point or another in the interview, "I just didn't get it," but later when on to tout self-development. Some offered that they lacked self-awareness when junior, but others pointed back at the institution, "I don't think self-development was a thing back then as far as something that [the Army] was pushing" which is factually incorrect. They probably just did not get it, like many others.

The problems surrounding self-development very often took a back seat to systems and procedures that do not technically belong in the domain. These include a lack of rewards and incentives and an admonishment of regulatory counseling requirements and its associated 360-degree feedback mechanism. The idea of some reward validates Deci and Ryan, as well as

Knowles and others' work. The officers interviewed clearly preferred the extrinsic valuation versus the larger intrinsic one, but both were acknowledged similarly.

The last prominent category in this theme is discouraging for a self-admitted learning organization. Apparently, there was not only a lack of mentoring, counseling, and self-development promotion but an active effort to suppress academic curiosity. This researcher experience was in line with those interviewed. Early in a career, value went to brawn and not brains. Bragging about how well one did on their fitness exam was far ahead of what book you read last night. This changed for me and some of the officers interviewed 'around the 10-year mark,' unsurprisingly. But not all interviewed seemed to rally to academics; instead, they said some peers could be too "bookish." The author has been accused of the same on many occasions. This anti-intellectualism is described well by Andy Rohrer (2014), who makes a good case that "...blame for this condition rest[s] on the bureaucracy of the institution."

4.2.6 What Works

Clearly, the other two domains support self-development, which is the design of the ALDM. So, when asked to specifically support their self-development actions, reading and mentoring were vastly described. Not surprisingly, these are also some of the more time-consuming methods. There were other things, as well: working out, independent course work, and structured development programs were common (see Appendix E for an example of a structured program). Overall, there was not one single thing this research could tease out. What is working is holistic and exactly what the Army wants.

Reading gets special attention because those interviewed had a common and expected theme. Early in a leader's career, reading topics were focused on the profession. Books, magazines, and journals about conflict were on top, as well as the Army's volumes of doctrine

and regulations. Every senior leader seems to have a recommended reading list to aid leaders.¹⁶ Then, ‘around ten years in’ the subjects changed. This researcher recalls arriving at a yearlong course on war and strategy, only to be given the book, “Money Ball” by Michael Lewis. It was meant as an introduction to analytics, and something the Army was advancing in the early 2000s. Those interviewed imparted the same, in that they not only enjoyed non-military reading more, but also gained different ideas and spent more time reflecting on the alien issues. Said one officer, “Books on learning theory or philosophy... [gave] me greater depth rather than just technical knowledge.”

As mentioned in the last section, mentoring in the Army needs some attention, but for those that had mentors (author included), their impact was significant. Not only were mentors a usual ‘spark’ in officer’s, but they continued to add fuel to the fire over many years. This is an Army expectation explained by the ‘develop others’ characteristic of leading. The Army should obviously expand on what seems to be an ace-card up its sleeve. But what if it is a two-of-clubs today?

4.2.7 Individual Motivations

This theme was very prominent across all demographics, but it is impossible for the research to dissect each category in detail (Figure 20). If there is a kaleidoscope of why Army officers partake in self-development, this is it. Although fascinating, it does not help answer the research question but might instead provide future insight on reversing the impact of the war. The notion of some ‘spark’ has already been introduced and explained.

¹⁶ The current U.S. Army Chief of Staff’s Professional Reading List is 60 pages long!
https://history.army.mil/html/books/105/105-1-1/CMH_Pub_105-5-1_2017.pdf

Motivations
Competition
Spark
Peers
Duty
Expectation
Curiosity
Care or Self-disciplined

Figure 20. Individual Motivations to Engage in Self-Development

In particular, one motivation deserves a bit more attention because it has been studied and in Army officers. Made more familiar to those outside the profession, General MacArthur’s 1962, “Duty, Honor, Country” speech conjures the essence of service to the Nation.¹⁷ The influence of ‘duty’ obliges leaders to do, and is related to another category of some expectation because they wear a uniform. Even when an officer is terrified and their existence (and that of their troops) is on the line, a sense of duty (among others) makes them act. Not only do they do the right thing, but they may physically and emotionally demonstrate the same to others (Dixon, Weeks, Boland Jr, & Perelli, 2017, pp. 309–310). Again, something the Army wholly expects of senior leaders but fostering duty is mysterious and complex (particularly if joining the Army is seen as a job).

4.2.8 Developing Others and 360 Assessments Lacked Much Mention

One theme became so because there was so little mention of it. When asked to explain the domain, one would expect someone to explain how they encouraged self-development in others. It is easy to say, ‘I do this or do that’ as examples, but that is not what people said. It was

¹⁷ It also includes the truest and famous statement, “the soldier, above all other people, prays for peace, for he must suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars of war.”
<https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/douglasmacarthurhayeraward.html>

only after the researcher asked pointed questions about developing others did he get some expected techniques, but the feedback was overall thin on details.

One valuable technique is to urge leaders to perform some 360-assessments to identify shortcomings that need developing. The value of this is not lost on the Army or other professions (McCarthy & Garavan, 1999, pp. 444–445). This is also something Army leaders can check. A leader can say ‘take the MSAF’ to a subordinate, and see if it happened. Discouragingly, this was what he heard, “If you had done 360 20 years ago... it would've been phenomenal;” “I certainly would have benefited from that kind of 360 assessment;” and “there was no feedback loop [to identify weaknesses].” It might have been good that these interviews were conducted on the telephone because the researcher could not have hidden his surprise. The online MSAF and a more manual version have been part of the ALDM since at least 1987.

The importance of developing others has already been addressed and is essential to the domain in question. Why was it so fleeting in the minds of many officers? Perhaps the time it takes, as mentioned, or another reason? Do they consider this part of their regulatory responsibility to counsel and not tied to self-development?

One reason could be the number of officers that require senior support – the educational agent or mentor. Theoretically, and based on some populations in Figure 21, a senior leader’s burden is not so great. But this figure is more descriptive of the population. In practice, and based on the researcher experience, a senior leader can expect to be responsible for 5-10 subordinate officers, and these doubles if you consider the NCO corps. You may have even more unofficial ties to past mentees as well. The reason for this is that many senior officers are not in charge of anyone; they sit on staffs doing technical analysis and planning, but even these officers will be in contact with junior ones that can benefit from an informal relationship.




Figure 21. Average Population by Grade Contrasting Year 2013

4.3 Analysis

The research question remains: How have 19 years of war impacted the U.S. Army's leader self-development today? The answer lies not so much in the past 19 years, but in the 10–13 prior to that. The results of this grounded theory study demonstrate that senior officers today have a poor understanding and appreciation of what the Army expects of them. They entered the war-period at what appears to be a crucial point—‘around the 10-year mark.’ As such, some got the ‘spark,’ while others did not, and research shows that each individual entered service with varying degrees of adult-learning savvy.

As then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said, “You go to war with the army you have,” and that is where it largely stayed in relation to the self-development domain. Historical impediments to self-development were amplified many-fold by the war. The available time alone justifies this, while the priority was rightfully put on winning. Officers joining after 2000 were caught in this and further impacted by a cohort that may or may not have ‘gotten it’ insofar as adult-learning.

This long war has eviscerated one-third of the ALDM. Time had another influence, in that over the past 19 years; very senior leaders that did their professional maturing in the 1970s to 1980s have left the force. When policy decisions to keep some officers involuntarily in service were lifted, those that had the most potential departed. The Army’s longitudinal research on leadership most likely had a blind spot in the self-development domain. While the other two domains are very clear, adult learning is less explicit. So, to ask a leader to gauge something they do not appreciate would gather questionable results. As these results show, officers today can only now see how poorly they understood. When asked to gauge their self-development, officers likely gave themselves far too much credit.

The analysis creates a larger question that draws on established research. There is a positive correlation between adult learning and creativity (Torrance and Mourad, 1978). The Army is striving for leaders that are not only comfortable with uncertainty but thrive in it. They want agile, adaptive, and resilient officers with strong character and innate professional judgment (DA, 2014b, p. 10). Can the Army achieve these things without first correcting its self-development domain? The author thinks the domain will self-correct over time, but will it be in time when needed next?

The answer to the research question can be seen in another way as well. If the Army knows there is a deficit in self-development, the problem is much more likely in the ‘develop others’ characteristic in the ALDM. Recall Brocket and Hiemstra’s PRO model. Junior leaders today are as curious as ever. One officer summarizes what many hinted at, “We've got a lot of young officers out there who are really, really hungry for information.” And given the PRO model, that is half of what is needed. The other is bosses, mentors, or educational agents to energize the learning.

The impact today may sound discouraging, but many officers remain dedicated to the domain. The concluding chapter will offer some areas for additional study and some ways to potentially kick-start or ‘spark’ others.

4.4 Summary

The analysis did not create a theory, but it painted a picture any army should be aware of. Sometimes history is all leaders have to guide them, and there is a long history of war, which is costly for any nation and in countless ways. For the U.S. Army, this recent conflict impacted their leaders in real time, and today still. The Army has relied on self-development to fill gaps in leadership that structured learning and operations failed to. It also gives credibility to the profession as a learning organization. The war in the early 21st century and this research paints an uncertain future given the pace of the world today.

Figure 22 demonstrates what might be happening to self-development in the Army. Here are six unique officer careers over time and surrounding the war period (the green-wedge shape is one career, or even a cohort introduced in Chapter 2, Figure 10). The red to the left of the figure reflects a well-documented Army revival after the Vietnam War. The two left-most careers represent a time when there was no kinetic war, while the third one with the “wars” bar

shows the last 19 years. The next two have a negative slope because the analysis suggests that the wars impact on self-development will have a lengthy and negative impact on the Army (the far-right career assumes this will reverse). At war, and without a vibrant self-development domain, an army's intellectual capacity is hobbled. Individual officer's sense of duty will erode, and they will prefer the status-quo; initiative will wane, while an anti-intellectual culture will pervade. Unchecked, a good-enough mentality that sees service as a job for money will shorten careers and experience. The final chapter provides some ideas to redraw this figure.




Figure 22. Self-Development and the Future

CHAPTER FIVE:

CONCLUSION

The illiterate of the 21st century will not be those who cannot read and write, but those who cannot learn, unlearn, and relearn. (Toffler, 2006)

Unlearning and relearning sounds easy. It is not, but that is what the Army must do and sooner insofar as self-development. This paper started with Peter Senge's (2010) idea about 'learning organizations,' so it ends with one of his more common citations and a popular rule, "Today's problems come from yesterday's "solutions"" (p. 57). In a sense, this is where the Army finds itself today, but it needs to keep his last rule in mind because it is often forgotten, "There is no blame" (Senge, 2010, p. 67).

The introduction also suggested, 'The Army may have several cohorts of leaders that are less capable of fostering self-development.' The research herein concludes this is true, but to what extent is still unknown and ripe for more study (see section 5.2). Overall, the Army has some organizational dissonance when it comes to leader self-development. In one voice, they clearly put the onus of developing others on leaders at every level. Therefore, the led are subject to extrinsic motivations like mentors, superiors, and some larger competition for promotion and recognition. In another, they explain that developing is an individual responsibility born from some intrinsic motivation to improve the self, while the collective—the Army—enjoys the benefits from it. It is satisfactory to have it both ways, but the Army should be certain it knows this. More importantly, it needs to educate its officers, which is the next section.

5.1 Improving the Domain

The self-development domain in the Army is fragmented and not beyond repair. The officers interviewed had their own ideas (Appendix K), but nearly all admitted it is a big, complex, and important problem to address. There is not one thing that will enhance the self-development domain's condition, but several quick-wins might shorten the impact from the war discussed in Chapter 4.

Ending the wars would be an obvious great start and win number one, but this is beyond the Army's control. The remainder of the wins are in no particular order.

Win 2: The Army could learn from its sister-services. The Navy, used to long to sea-deployments that add up over the years, is already addressing what it found in 2018: “widespread shortfall in basic seamanship” (Larter, 2018). Given the costly ship accidents over the past several years, there is very likely something going on. The Navy is addressing this by vastly expanding access and resources to its officer to attend advanced degree programs (Kenney, 2020).

Win 3: This researcher has always championed an increased military-academia relationship. Yes, there is ROTC and some other efforts mentioned in Chapter 2, but it could be so much better, and both professions would benefit greatly. The Army brings people and resources, while the institutions bring knowledge—both bring new approaches to share. A focused and institutionally driven approach can finally mix .mil and .edu more than it is today. Since the Army wants innovated leaders, why not send them to the nation's innovation-playground – its many, many campuses. The precedent for this already exists with business and is called “Training With Industry.”

Win 4: Based on a constant flow of military professional journals, blogs, and articles, the Army knows it has leadership and other problems to solve. This is a quasi-steady-state condition for all armies. Some of these are aging equipment and technical shortfalls that are extraordinarily expensive, but a new administration and the country's financial woes from COVID could present an opportunity.

Assume then, that the Army's budget will be significantly reduced. The time and energy put into testing, development, and acquisition of hardware can be partially re-directed to less physical and more mental stimulus. One officer interviewed hit this target squarely, "The self-development domain in the Army is inherently linked to the strength of the institutional Army because that's where the core technical knowledge of the profession resides, and that's the benchmark against which self-development occurs." Fortunately for the Army, but less so for many small institutions, there are a lot of unemployed higher-educators available since COVID. The Army can afford this change since it takes industry a relatively short time to ramp-up defense production in a crisis and far less than it takes to nurture senior leaders. The German army found itself in a similar place after WWI; kept from keeping much equipment and forced to keep its size small, the Wehrmacht literally went back to school. The results were militarily historic.

Win 5: The most capable capacity to reverse war impacts lies today in its senior leaders. As discussed, this cohort is degraded but far better suited than a lieutenant with three years in the force. More priority should be placed on developing others; in other words, 'what are you doing to get your juniors to engage in self-development?' When called on to the account, there is a history of success as noted by this officer, "Without a forcing function, nothing in the Army gets

done.” In the case of self-development, it will come to an Army decision on priorities. These will need to be guided by additional research, which is the next section.

Win 6: This win is tied to the priority win before, and it is as simple as making more time for self-development. The two need to comingle because you cannot have one without the other, while the analysis clearly defines time as derogatory to self-development. The allocated time does not need to be forever, either. A resourced effort by the Army will re-instill not only the importance of life-long learning but add tools for leaders to use now and as they gain rank. Consider this muscle memory, but for the brain.

Several weeks before this research went to final submission, the Army published an “Action Plan to Prioritize People and Teams” and admitted that, “People are our greatest strength, our most valuable asset, and our most important weapon system.” It was very reassuring to read, “We will strive to reduce [operational tempo], adjust policies to prioritize People, and reduce requirements to provide leaders additional time to invest in their People” (Grinston, McConville, & McCarthy, 2019a). It went on to say what else is needed: “investing significant resources;” focusing on smaller units; reducing competing demands; adding metrics; and adjusting policies via a “holistic review.” Perhaps someone will even read this dissertation?

5.2 Areas for Future Research

Separating the Army from its leaders and vice-versa might be possible, but future research needs to consider both and simultaneously. They might technically be separate units of measurements, but those seeking real impact should not ignore the sum of the whole. Chapter 4 had questions like, ‘Is the first decade of service wasted insofar as self-development’ and ‘Why are officers slow to recall and demonstrate the developing others characteristic?’ There are others too, but the three below might be the most interesting and have the most impact.

5.2.1 Measuring Self-development and Developing Others

This idea is not lost on anyone, including this officer: “If you don't have that anchor point, then you don't have a metric upon which to move forward from to say this is what self-development should look like.” The Self-Directed Learning Readiness Scale is one of many solutions, while the Army should consider expanding the work Boyce et al. (2010). Regardless, the self-reporting technique will only measure so much. Once a measurement is achieved, those that excel should be rewarded, and those lagging should be targeted for learning immersion or removed from the ranks. Simultaneously, a study on what attributes and conditions lead to positive and negative outcomes could inform future resources.

From Chapter 4, the research suggests that the Army not only has a self-development problem, but also a developing others one. The Army needs to reevaluate how it prepares officers to develop those around them and at every level. This is not simply for soldiers, but organizations too. Here is where a deficit in creativity and initiative might be reversed. Research along these lines should specifically look at why the Army has ‘initiative groups’ and what value or initiative they actually create.

5.2.2 Reexamine Self-Development Resources

Boring. That is what this researcher thought when reviewing the long list of self-development resources available to officers and all soldiers (Appendix F). Some of these are very good and informed by science, but others are outdated. Put bluntly, animated and clumsy videos from 2000 will simply not compete with today’s realistic games and the expectations of younger soldiers.

There is also a vast number of resources to consider. Without some direction, which we know is lacking, where does a junior leader start? A relatively simple study could discover what

resources are at least interesting to varying cohorts. Other questions include: when in an officer's career are these introduced; how often are they accessed; and what value do they provide, which bring us back to measuring and analytics?

5.2.3 Replicate this Research

As mentioned, the Army uses Likert-scales when measuring its people, and there is nothing particularly wrong here. Still, soldiers have a lot more to say, and then there is how they say it. The officers interviewed were very passionate about leading and the Army's mission. They did not simply, 'neither agree or disagree'—they painted a colorful and service-informed picture instead of a black dot. A study group should consider interviewing 100–150 officers and also gather data from different officer cohorts. A case study on how overall leadership development is developed and or measured would also be valuable.

Two other wars might also inform this research, and taken as a whole, might even produce a solid theory. The Soviet's 10-year war in Afghanistan in the 1980s is now 30-years old, and it is obviously over. What came of their officer corps following its end? Did they face similar problems, and if so, what did they do? The Soviet General Staff kept vast and meticulous records. A relatively new war is still going on between Russia and Ukraine (that began in 2014). Now six years in, has Ukraine had to take similar army expansion steps?

5.3 Summary

Not every futurist like Alvin Toffler gets it right, but if the conditions and impacts of history inform it, then it is better than guessing what might come to be. I wish the results of this research were different, but I am pleased to see that the Army is not standing still. The cascade of blue boxes on the right of Figure 3 are accomplished leaders leaving the Army. I am confident they will endeavor to make the lower red ovals disappear before they do. It might have been

serendipity that the figure ends in 2028, but today’s Army Vision states, “The Army of 2028 will be ready to deploy, fight, and win decisively against any adversary, anytime and anywhere...

[with] exceptional Leaders and Soldiers of unmatched lethality” (DA, 2018). To this, I say,

“hooah!”




Figure 3 (Repeated). Cascading Impact of Time, War and Rank on Self-Development

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Study Invitation and Informed Consent



Informed Consent to Participate in Research Involving Minimal Risk

Information to Consider Before Taking Part in this Research Study

Title: Understanding Today's Impact of 18 Years of War on Leader Self-Development and the Future Influences it Might Have on the U.S. Army Officer Corps

Study #: 0000104

Overview: You are being asked to take part in a research study. The information in this document should help you to decide if you would like to participate. The sections in this overview provide the basic information about the study. More detailed information is provided in the remainder of the document.

Study Staff: This study is being led by Stephen Pomper who is a student at the University of South Florida. This person is called the Principal Investigator. Stephen Pomper is being guided in this research by Dr. Grandon Gill. Other approved research staff may act on behalf of him.

Study Details: This study is being conducted at the University of South Florida, Tampa, FL and is supported by the Principle Investigator. The purpose of the study is to better understand the state of the Army Leader Self-Development domain. As a participant you will be asked to present your perspectives on Army leader self-development at different points in your career, as well as the value you attribute to the process.

Subjects: You are being asked to take part because you are an Army officer and your Year Group indicates you served from at least 1991 to today (or separated from service in the past year).

Voluntary Participation: Your participation is voluntary and you may stop your participation at any time. You should only take part in this study if you want to volunteer and should not feel that there is any pressure to take part in the study. There will be no penalties or loss of benefits or opportunities if you do not participate or decide to stop once you start.

Benefits, Compensation, and Risk: We do not know if you will receive any direct benefit from your participation. The potential benefits of participating in this research study include reflecting on self-development, which can be rewarding in itself. There is no cost to participate, and you will not be compensated for your participation. This research is considered minimal risk (also known as 'negligible' in Army doctrine. Minimal risk means that study risks are the same as the risks you face in daily life.

Confidentiality: Even if we publish the findings from this study, we will keep your study information private and confidential. We will not publish anything that would let people know who you are. Anyone with the authority to look at your records must keep them confidential.

Why are you being asked to take part?

You are invited to join this research study to investigate the self-development domain in Army leaders. A decision to join is greatly appreciated. In this research study, I am investigating your lived experience with the phenomenon of self-development in your Army career. I will use a semi-structured

interview, and any appropriate follow up with you as needed, to explore your experience and your reflection on that experience in order to complete a dissertation research project.

Study Procedures:

We will plan to meet one time at a semi-private location that is advantageous to you. The interview will be recorded and will last approximately 35 minutes. The information will be transcribed by a third party, but only I will know your identify via file naming protocols. The recording and transcripts will be kept in my possession for five years and then deleted. The questions will focus on your past experiences in leader self-development, mentoring others and being mentored. Other questions will ask you to compare self-development activities, thoughts there impact from different times in your career. I will ask your opinion of Army efforts to foster self-development too. There are no preparations needed for the meeting.

Total Number of Subjects:

About 3 individuals will take part in this study at USF. A total of 15-25 individuals will participate in the study at all sites, although the sites are still to be determined, but near U.S. Army bases.

Privacy and Confidentiality:

We will do our best to keep your records private and confidential. We cannot guarantee absolute confidentiality. Your personal information may be disclosed if required by law. Certain people may need to see your study records. These individuals include:

- The research team, including the Principal Investigator, and all other research staff.
- Certain government and university people who need to know more about the study. For example, individuals who provide oversight on this study may need to look at your records. This is done to make sure that we are doing the study in the right way. They also need to make sure that we are protecting your rights and your safety.
- The USF Institutional Review Board (IRB) and its related staff who have oversight responsibilities for this study, and staff in USF Research Integrity and Compliance.

You can get the answers to your questions, concerns, or complaints.

If you have any questions, concerns or complaints about this study, call **Stephen Pomper at 254-462-7676**. If you have questions about your rights, complaints, or issues as a person taking part in this study, call the USF IRB at (813) 974-5638 or contact by email at RSCH-IRB@usf.edu.

Would you like to participate in this study?

Appendix B: Institutional Review Board Approval



EXEMPT DETERMINATION

February 7, 2020

Stephen Pomper
2832 Forest Glen Dr
Baldwin, MD 21013

Dear Mr. Stephen Pomper:

On 2/7/2020, the IRB reviewed and approved the following protocol:

Application Type:	Initial Study
IRB ID:	STUDY000104
Review Type:	Exempt 2
Title:	Understanding Today's Impact of 18 Years of War on Leader Self-Development and the Future Influences it Might Have on the U.S. Army Officer Corps
Funding:	None
Protocol:	Pomepr_HRP-503a - Social-Behavioral Protocol_6 Feb 20.docx

The IRB determined that this protocol meets the criteria for exemption from IRB review.

In conducting this protocol, you are required to follow the requirements listed in the INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103).

Please note, as per USF policy, once the exempt determination is made, the application is closed in BullsIRB. This does not limit your ability to conduct the research. Any proposed or anticipated change to the study design that was previously declared exempt from IRB oversight must be submitted to the IRB as a new study prior to initiation of the change. However, administrative changes, including changes in research personnel, do not warrant a modification or new application.

Ongoing IRB review and approval by this organization is not required. This determination applies only to the activities described in the IRB submission and does not apply should any changes be made. If changes are made and there are questions about whether these activities impact the exempt determination, please submit a new request to the IRB for a determination.

Sincerely,

Jennifer Walker
IRB Research Compliance Administrator

A PREEMINENT RESEARCH UNIVERSITY

Institutional Review Boards / Research Integrity & Compliance
FWA No. 00001669
University of South Florida / 3702 Spectrum Blvd., Suite 165 / Tampa, FL 33612 / 813-974-5638

Appendix C: Army Leadership Requirement Model




Figure 1C. Army Leadership Requirements Model

Appendix D: Interview Questions

1. “Describe what comes to mind when you hear, ‘Army leader self-development domain?’”
 - Do you know the ALDM?
 - Is this something you ascribe to?
 - What then, do you call it?
2. “Tell me about your self-development journey from commissioning to 2001.”
 - How did your superiors encourage you to be better? In the Army? In life?
 - What was the role of mentors – not bosses?
 - What was your motivation to engage in such learning activities?
3. “For the past five or so years, what sorts of activities do you engage in that you consider self-development?”
 - Do you impart these on your subordinates? How? Why?
 - Has the role of mentors changed in your later service?
 - What is your current motivation to better yourself? And others?
4. “What were the impediments to self-development activities while you were preparing for deployment and deployed?”
 - How did mentoring differ during this period?
 - Did you sense a difference during high OPTEMPO times?
5. Given the importance the Army places on SD, is it putting ‘its money where its mouth is?’
6. “If the Army tasked you to improve the self-development domain in ALDM – what might you do first?”
7. “Do you have anything else you think is important for me to understand about your self-development journey, or the state of the domain for the Army?”
 - What gauge, if any, do you ascribe to self-development in you and others?

Appendix E: Example Battalion Officer Development Program

The figure after the text is an actual battalion-level plan, and is better than most.

CONCEPT

1. Formal Instruction. Self-development is augmented by formal classes that provide additional information on selected tactical and leader related topics. The training schedule will reflect these classes. These classes will normally take two forms:

- Leader Team Training pertains to all officers covering general, non-tactical, and professional topics.
- Nested Leader Training pertains to leaders two levels down from the sponsor (lieutenants are the focus for battalion nested leader training). These cover tactical topics along with conceptual, interpersonal, and technical skills.

2. Task List. To focus efforts for leader development, specific tasks for lieutenants are included at enclosure 1. These tasks are designed to round out an officer's development and facilitate integration into the unit. They cover topics other than those normally associated with accomplishing unit training. Lieutenants will work in conjunction with their company commander or principal staff supervisor to complete these tasks successfully. As a goal, leaders should complete these tasks within 90 days of assignment.

3. Counseling. Professional, routine, and goal-based counseling is an integral part of the professional development process. Company commanders, principal staff officers, and the battalion commander will execute counseling plans to ensure that individual goals are established and professional assessments are provided. Enclosure 1 tasks should be used to develop assessments and monitor professional development of junior officers. Performance counseling as outlined in ATP 6-22.1 will occur according to battalion policy. Counseling will occur in the officer's work area, not the battalion commander's office. Formal evaluation counseling will be the exception. Officers should be prepared to discuss performance and future goals and objectives. Officers should also be prepared to discuss their self-development program and unit goals. Company commanders will arrange counseling sessions with the battalion commander through the adjutant based on their training schedule. The counseling rotation schedule follows:

- Staff officers and HHC: January, April, July, October.
- Alpha & Charlie Companies: February, May, August, November.
- Bravo & Delta Companies: March, June, September, December.

4. Professional Reading. Professional reading is a valued part of self-development. There are numerous recommended reading lists available. Additionally, technology (distance learning and other web-based applications) allows the easy production and dissemination of training videos on a variety of military-related topics. Additionally, several binders of instructional materials are available for use and review in the S3 shop.

5. Mentorship. Nothing is more effective for professional development than a senior leader taking personal interest in the development of a subordinate. Effective mentorship requires an interested and receptive senior and an equally interested and receptive subordinate. It cannot be forced or dictated. I cannot be virtue or rank or position simply state, "I am your mentor". It is much more complicated than that. Senior officers take an interest in junior officers by imparting the benefit of their experience and knowledge. Junior officers should recognize this as a valuable resource and seek opportunities to learn from more senior and experienced officers.

PROGRAM RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Battalion commander

- Serves as the primary trainer and teacher for lieutenants. Certifies that lieutenants are proficient and can execute required tasks to standard.
- Plans and executes the battalion program with staff and company commander assistance.
- Provides feedback to officers on their leader development progress.
- Manages assignment opportunities for lieutenants.
- Assists in development of assignment patterns for company and field grade officers.

2. Company commanders and principal staff officers

- Assistant trainer and teacher for lieutenants. Enable lieutenants in completing tasks to standard.
- Provide feedback to junior officers on their leader development progress.
- Ensure newly assigned officers are briefed and enrolled in battalion programs.
- Authorized to expand the program into areas deemed necessary for advancement.

3. Individual officers

- Participate in Leader Team Training and Nested Leader Training.
- Develop, with your rater, an individual development plan.
- Lieutenants will complete certification tasks specified at enclosure 1. The goal for completion of these tasks is within 90 days of assignment.

IMPLEMENTATION

This program is effective upon receipt of this memorandum. Many of the tasks listed at enclosure 1 may have already been completed by more senior lieutenants. In this case, rating officers (commanders or principal staff) are authorized to grandfather the appropriate tasks.

CONCLUSION

Development of leaders is the most important thing we do. Our Soldiers deserve nothing less than fully qualified leaders who understand and enforce high standards of mission accomplishment.




Figure 1E. Example Battalion Program

Appendix F: Army Leader Development Resources

(<https://usacac.Army.mil/core-functions/leader-development>)

The Army Leader Development Program (ALDP) is the Army's Program for managing HQDA approved leader development initiatives. The ALDP is the sole management process for program execution, approval, incorporation of new initiatives, and recommendations for prioritization of resources including the Army Leadership Development Strategy (ALDS). The ALDS provides vision and guidance for developing leaders of all cohorts and components that exercise mission command while executing unified land operations.

LeaderMap: LeaderMap provides information on how to shape and conduct leader development. It is designed to help you increase the success of leader development for your unit, your team, your followers, and yourself.

This tool brings to life key concepts from the FM 6-22 and other Army Doctrine on leadership. Not all topics in the FM 6-22 are covered in this tool. For this reason, you should use LeaderMap as a supplement to, not a replacement for the Army Doctrine on leadership. Select the links below to access the complete versions of the Doctrine.

62nd Medical Brigade Professional Development Book: This Leader Professional Development Booklet is for Senior NCOs and Detachment Sergeants. Every leader is strongly encouraged to use and share the information within this booklet.

ARNG Leader Dev Strategy (LDS): The Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) builds on our Army's experiences since the end of the Cold War including the past eight years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan and on our assessment that the future operational environment will be even more uncertain, complex, and competitive as hybrid threats challenge us across unified land operations.

Asymmetric Warfare Group: The U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group provides operational advisory and Solution Development support globally to the Army and Joint Force Commanders to enhance Soldier survivability and combat effectiveness, and enable the defeat of current and emerging threats in support of Unified Land Operations.

Asymmetric Warfare Group Adaptive Soldier and Leader Training and Education (ASLTE): The ASLTE approach is a way to think and plan differently about how to conduct outcome-oriented training and education that purposefully develops the 21st Century Soldier Competencies necessary for operational adaptability.

ATP 6-22.1 THE COUNSELING PROCESS: Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 6-22.1 provides doctrinal guidance for all leaders, military and civilian, responsible for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing counseling actions. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this publication.

Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) Resources: Cyber electromagnetic activities are activities leveraged to seize, retain, and exploit an advantage over adversaries and enemies in

both cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, while simultaneously denying and degrading adversary and enemy use of the same and protecting the mission command system (ADRP 3-0). CEMA consist of cyberspace operations (CO), electronic warfare (EW), and spectrum management operations (SMO). Army forces conduct CEMA as a unified effort. Integration is the arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole. Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time (JP 1-02).

Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE): CAPE is the Army Force Modernization Proponent for Army-wide Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) responsibilities to advance the Army Profession, its Ethic and the Character Development of Army's professionals. Intent: Provide senior leaders with the educational resources, narrative, and ideas to reinvigorate the Army Profession across all Army cohorts. Enable the Army to refocus on the professional identity that motivates ethical behavior, maintains high levels of competence, and enhances stewardship of the profession.

Commander's Handbook for Unit Leader Development: This handbook is designed to provide commanders with an efficient and effective way to develop leaders. This handbook draws on the input of successful Army commanders and non-commissioned officers, recent Army leadership studies, research on effective practices from the private and public sectors, and applicable Army regulations and doctrine.

Company Commander & First Sergeant Pre-Command Course: The Purpose of the Company Commander/First Sergeant Pre-Command Course (CCFSPCC) is to provide company command teams knowledge in key areas leading to effective leadership in garrison operations.

Developing Leadership During Unit Training Exercises: This handbook is designed to provide O/T's and leaders in the chain of the command the tools and techniques needed to identify and feed back to leaders what their leadership looks like and how it impacts Soldier performance and mission accomplishment.

School for Command Preparation: School for Command Preparation (SCP) serves as lead agent within the Command Team Preparation Program. SCP ensures that command preparation programs remain compliant and relevant across and within each of the four phase program through the Command Team Enterprise.

Doctrine Update Publications: The United States Army Combined Arms Center publishes the Doctrine Update periodically to highlight recent and upcoming changes to doctrine and provides information related to doctrine use. This Doctrine Update provides information on the overall Doctrine strategy. This update is disseminated to the lowest level to maximize the understanding of doctrine and the timelines of significant publications.

Institutional Training Management: The purpose of this page is to provide unit training managers with an overview of how the Army programs and manages institutional training

Leader Developmental Improvements Guide June 2014: This Leader Development Improvement Guide (LDI Guide) provides Army leaders at all levels with ideas and activities for

professional growth, development, and continuous learning that can be incorporated into an Individual Development Plan (IDP) or used informally when a leader wants to improve in a particular area. Leaders at all levels can use this guide as a handbook to jump start their ideas for self development.

Mission Command Case Studies: This page provides commanders and leaders with principles of mission command case studies suitable for use in Leader Development Programs.

Mission Training Complex-Joint Base Lewis-McChord Leadership Training and Development: The MTC-JBLM's Leadership Training and Development page provides a collection of videos and publications that leaders can use to enhance unit leadership training and development. Videos include combat action lessons-learned, decision making exercises, battle accounts, leaders talking about leadership, and many others. Publications include relevant leadership professional development articles, leadership doctrine, and reading lists

Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback

Operation Winter Road: Path to Security: The Operation Winter Road video chronicles 1-38 IN battalion's combat operations and leadership lessons learned during their 2012-2013 deployment to the Panjwai District of Afghanistan. 1-38 Infantry's area of operations was characterized by very complex terrain, was extremely kinetic, was a long time insurgent safe haven, and was infested with hundreds of pressure plate anti-personnel IEDs. This video documents how the Soldiers and Leaders adapted to the challenges of the environment, how the battalion defeated the insurgents, secured the population, and turned over security responsibility to Afghanistan forces. Highlighted leadership lessons included in the video are: Mission Command; agility and adaptability; the importance of trust; rehearsals; leadership and confidence; focusing on fundamentals; relationships; combined arms breaching; and counter IED techniques.

Training Capabilities and Best Practices: The purpose of this page is to provide user-friendly and intuitive access to the location, purpose, use, and TTPs or best practices for using Army Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations.

U.S. Army Chief of Staff's Professional Reading List: The U.S. Army Chief of Staff's Professional Reading List is divided into six categories: 1. Strategic Environment 2. Regional Studies 3. History and Military History 4. Leadership 5. Army Profession 6. Fiction. These sub-lists are intended to steer readers to topics in which they are most interested. Each of these books is suitable for readers of any rank or position.

Appendix G: Memorable Interview Quotes

Below are some additional and more memorable quotes from officers for different reasons. Although they lack total context, I think you will get their point.

- What we risk doing is just leaving behind that entire generation.
- We had 12 people who thought exactly the same. They had the exact same experiences through life.
- I don't think I really got my act together until I was about 10 years into the Army.
- During the height of the war, you didn't have to think very hard about how to deploy your unit. There was a system already in place. You just got in line and did what they told you to do on trackers... You just got in line, marched along like a good soldier.
- I'll be sitting in my office with my feet up on my desk and he'll come walking in and he'll be, "what are you doing?" "I'm reading." Well, "What do you mean you're reading." And I'm like, "I'm reading. It's part of my job."
- You get out of the force for two years, three years to go to graduate school, you come back and then I say, "You don't have any operational experience, I won't promote you. Your file's not good enough."
- If I go to school, no OERs, don't get promoted, bad, don't get smarter. Don't gain any knowledge. Don't think outside the box. Fall in line, kiss the boss's behind. Do what you got to do to promote.
- We've talked a lot about leader development, but how do we teach our leaders how to leader develop?
- Look, there's no easy button to success. There's no real fast pass. There's no accelerate button. It's a lot of hard work and then you go through the paces of, yes, you have to read.
- The one thing he realized as he was a four star..., that at the end of the day, no matter what rank you achieve, the only thing you leave behind is the legacy that you leave in your subordinates.
- I think the older ones of us who are still around and we probably need to take a few minutes and think about what is it that I wished I had known how to do and help pay that forward to the group that's still here.

- You got brigade commanders, now you have general officers. They do not know how to fight properly and it's not their fault. When it was their time to be developed, we sent them to Iraq and Afghanistan instead of learning how to attack in the field, which was the process we had.
- If you are responsible for training and certifying subordinates two levels down and you don't have that knowledge base, then who's doing it...?
- I attribute my own personal self-development... [it] is absolutely decisive to the success I had as an Army officer in terms of both personal career success.
- I grabbed a manual and started reading it. I'm like, "Holy crap. They tell you how to do this!"
- Is it called self-development if you force somebody to do it? Or that training?
- When you're a leader in the Army, you're constantly involved in helping others do what they need to do. And sometimes you don't do a great job of sitting back and doing what you think you need to do.
- If you don't point them in the right direction or give them a starting point or set conditions for self-development to happen, it probably won't.
- To some people being in the military is just a job..., they're not going to go out of their way. They'll never do [self-development].
- I get up early, come home late and rely really on my operational experiences. [They] have provided the most of my development as an officer.
- I just don't know that there are literally enough hours in the day for guys that are running with the operational Army to have a meaningful outside of your work day, self-development effort.
- I can tell you just from walking down and engaging [with] people..., the ones who do self-development and the ones who don't... They can pull things together in a logic trail... deconstruct arguments... unpack things.
- I don't know that the army realizes what's happening around it.

Appendix I: Reflecting on 30 Years of Army Service: A Message to Leaders

This appendix is for Army cadets and new lieutenants. It's relatively short and easy to read, because you are busy – or should be. It's for captains and majors too if you don't already know, or just need reminding. And it's for lieutenant colonels, colonels and generals to pass along in this form; or better yet, with some thoughts of your own. I suppose it is for all professionals as well.

You are going to read about self-development below, and it will make you a better leader and person. It's one of three domains of leadership development, which is essential to your job, if not your job altogether. Development like this does not have an end-point; it's many-many points overtime, and you will hear and read about leadership development as being "life-long." You will get plenty of skills from the other two domains (operational and institutional), but this is simply not enough. If you have not found the start-point then keep reading, but know that you will only get out of any domain what you put into it.

Think of leadership development as a three-legged stool. It won't stand on two legs, and will fall over if one or more legs gets too long. Overtime the legs lengths will vary, so be aware and take actions to prevent it. The Army uses three circles that overlap to demonstrate how each domain compliments the others. The overlap is where the "magic happens;" in that, something you learn in one domain helps you solve or learn in another – and so on.

The Army expects that your bosses and leaders will guide you, and you will guide others soon enough. Recall that "develops others" is an essential leader attribute. DON'T WAIT for them to come to you. The 'self' part is crucial early in your Army service, because meaningful development does not just happen. My research says it will naturally get better around your 10th year of service, but don't wait. This means you need to discover (or enhance) that intrinsic motivation to excel as an officer and as person sooner. The Army also expects you will discover this, with some help, but don't plan solely on this boss, the next one, and the ones after these for guidance.

Why? By no fault of their own, they may have various ideas how to develop you. Or maybe none. Some will fail the task outright, but not even the Army can blame them. This domain and the Army's emphasis have historically ebbed and flowed in the macro sense. Individually, some officers ascribe to it more than others, or simply because they had a head start and better guides. The recent wars have degraded self-development in the Army. The development that did take place was likely, and rightfully, on war-related tasks. There are times for laser focus, but you cannot always be this way (or life-long).

The list of impediments to self-development is like sand grains on a beach, but there is one large rock in the middle – TIME. I often quip, 'time is like gold, so treat it that way.' You can use, 'there's not enough time' as an excuse not to engage in self-development activities, but you are only lying to yourself and those around you. The Army should not blame time either, because they are probably already limiting it for you. You cannot control all waking hours, but you can

with some. It is simply a decision to prioritize one thing over another. Prioritizing is basically straight forward, and we do it all day long without really thinking about it.

Priority is routinely gauged by some value you attribute to things. The value of self-development appreciates as time goes by, so you may not see much, if any value in it today. In this case, you are wrong. No blame – I did it too, but wish I had gotten my game together sooner. You need to prioritize self-development higher and now, because: 1) the Army has ordered you to do it, so be a good Soldier, and 2) you will be a better leader and person. And, ‘better’ is simply better, and who does not want that? Of course, ‘better’ is relative to some starting point before.

Where do I start? I would imagine you already have desire to improve because you wear boots to work, but it is crucial to get more serious. By ‘crucial,’ I literally mean that lives depend on it. Your strengths are already yours, and will likely improve by simply being you and over time. Improving shortcomings should be your first priority, and since we all have them, it should be easy. ‘Should,’ but it is not. Often times you are either blind to them, or frankly, lying to yourself and probably because it makes you uncomfortable. And that boss might not want to bring it up because of the same reasons (blind and uncomfortable). The Army’s 360-MASF is a great start.

The next thing to do is read. Science says your mental cognition – or how smart you are – has very little to no bearing on your propensity to engage in self-development. So, no a leader has any excuse not to get after this. For ten years I bemoaned reading, and basically read what I “had to.” For me, my reading spark came via military history (Slim’s “Defeat into Victory,” it’s a tough, but inspiring read). I suppose it did not have to be history, but this genre opened the door to many others, and admittedly not all. Reading the same book at different times in your life is also rewarding, because you gain new insights with ever increasing maturity and, well, development. So read, and there are countless book-lists to choose from. If you don’t like some book or article, try another as they will not run out. It may go without say, but you must read the doctrine! Think of them as rules to a very serious game you do not want to lose. Prioritize your reading.

Finally, and for this paper, is to find a mentor or several. You don’t need a compass, but a lot of Soldiers don’t really understand mentoring. Read the doctrine. Actually, it’s not that much help, since the rules for mentoring, in my experience, is sort of made as you go. It will be someone you “click” with and respect – someone you can easily have a candid and honest conversation with. You will have mentors for life-stuff and Army-stuff among other things. Having a rewarding mentor-relationship only takes a little time and effort for both. And be a mentor to others since it is rewarding.

I said this would be short. I hope you have three starter-tools in your leader ruck-sack, and you will add to this over the years. If this did not make any sense to you, please talk to someone for another perspective. Self-develop and lead on!

Appendix J: Sample of Codes, Categories and Themes

1 st Order Code Examples	Categories	Themes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • With self-development... sometimes I'm not even sure what we're talking about • What we've done is sort of become a check the block exercise • There's a mismatch between the intent of self-development and the desired outcome of self-development • I don't know that there are literally enough hours in the day for guys... to have a meaningful outside of your work day, self-development effort • There is a misconception among the force in terms of what leader development as a whole means • Well, how is it being measured? 	Leader confusion / frustration	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If the Army doesn't make it easy to do the right thing, we're not going to do it. • I have heard leader development and self-development for over a decade... and I have not seen an emphasis put on it other than in words • The Army says a lot of things are important and sometimes they follow through and sometimes they don't • I don't know that the army realizes what's happening around it. • Telling us to do self-development without providing the resources such as time or opportunities is somewhat hypocritical • If you're not going to measure it, then you can't say that it's a priority • Without a forcing function, nothing in the army gets done • Do I think that the resource allocation is out of balance? Yes. • A good idea, poorly executed 	Leader blames the Army	Institutional Responsibility
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A challenge for us institutionally is self-development • Non-existent • I think that we do a pretty much of a hand wave over self-development • The first thing that goes overboard is self-development • There's a lot we could do to improve • An officer's motivation to develop himself further, it's not really rewarded. • There's a lot of things you can do, but the value is not put on it. It's not measured 	It is a problem	
1 st Order Code Examples	Categories	Themes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We've talked a lot about leader development, but how do we teach our leaders how to leader develop? • At the end of the day... the only thing you leave behind is the legacy that you leave in your subordinates • I lead through teaching • He took a personal interest in me and my family 	Importance of educational agents	"Educational Agents"

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What you don't see... [is] commanders and leaders trying to enforce or encourage those types of activities • Back in the mid 90s... those officers were aware of their responsibility to develop subordinates and they got after it • I'm not the best at it either. I try to do the best I can with it • My gut tells me that they're not. But maybe many of them are. I'm just not seeing it. • We have a significant generational divide right now. • We've got a lot of young officers out there who are really, really hungry for information. Their only problem is they don't know what questions to ask, and they don't know where to go. 	<p>It is a problem today</p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We don't tell them what that self-development looks like, other than to say work on your weaknesses • There is a good core of people who can do it... [and] there are people who are not doing it at all... some of it is because they're unable personally • If you don't point them in the right direction or give them a starting point or set conditions for self-development to happen, it probably won't. • Just by mathematics there's less people there to codify and develop the profession's technical knowledge. As that gets eroded and by extension you're going to see a degradation of what the standard is for professional development. • Don't have those above you or laterally that you want to help and create this mindset of self-development and lifelong learning. 	<p>Lack of educational agents</p>	
<p>1st Order Code Examples</p>	<p>Categories</p>	<p>Themes</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In a unit getting ready to deploy and you're working 16 hour days, or 18 hour days or whatever • But this idea that we're overloaded with tasks, there's not much time to do things like self-development • As soon as, of course, the wars kicked in, there didn't seem to be much time. • That was spent almost exclusively learning the geography, the train, the groups, and then the technical specifics of how to do my job • Then after deployment, I didn't get back into it, unless that after the deployment is you got nine months to go back. • Your scope became so narrow that every step had before going to war, was focused on that • There wasn't any self-development going on brother • When it was their time to be developed, we sent them to Iraq and Afghanistan instead of learning how to attack in the fed, which was the process we've had. • Your self-development time was limited because you were on a fast train. • Everything was handed to us during that period. During the height of the war, you didn't have to think very hard about how to deploy your unit. There was a system 	<p>War</p>	<p>Little Time</p>

<p>already in place. You just got in line and did what they told you to do on trackers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I can do it in three words. Lack of time. • I think the point where we were tired enough, we just got lazy and said, "You know, this Army says we have to have this. It must be good enough. That's all I need." • When you did the war, first of all, the hours are crushing • Getting access to relevant information. • Let's say circa 2003, 2004, it was simply access to information and understanding of what was going on, • Just access to a lot of those things. • I was at a loss a lot of the time, I couldn't find the right things. • In deployment it's a little hard talk about self-development. • Your self-development time was limited because you were on a fast train • The only impediment during deployment is... very limited time... so, it becomes a competition for that most pressure for resource of time • When it was their time to be developed, we sent them to Iraq and Afghanistan instead of learning • The high tempo itself was a major barrier because everybody was so busy doing all the things that needed to be done. They really didn't have much extra bandwidth to be doing nice to have things. • I spent a lot of nights... where it was 10:30, 11:00 at night before I'd be done and it was just easier to just sleep at the office • We're over-structured and undermanned as an organization, so giving people back time is going to be difficult because that's how we compensate has an org, as an Army by being over-structured and undermanned. • It seemed like I hit a deployment every time I started one [master's program]. • I think it was that the big impediment is just the volume of tasks that need to be accomplished as you're preparing for deployment... we get so task-infatuated 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I've got a working wife and 4 kids, so most of my time is taken up by them • I can do it in three words. Lack of time • Today in terms of ubiquity of smartphones, and laptops, and all the other things that just constantly are sucking away at your time or bidding for your time. • I moved every year for seven years straight. When I wasn't moving, I was deployed. A lot of times it was unfeasible to really get after it • I try to still do some reading, but unfortunately I just find myself more and more distracted for a whole host of reasons. 	External distractions	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We don't give officers time to reflect as much • Time constraints and requirements 	No time to reflect	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When you're in a daily grind, it's hard to step back and reflect on who you are and where you want to be • So the whole notion that we've had time sucks • Time. Well, time and where you pay for that is you don't have time to reflect • Time to get it done and time to evaluate it, and time to get feedback on it. Those key and critical opportunities get tossed overboard • In church I will say, we did have the opportunity while deployed to do more spiritual reflection and in time, having some meaningful internal moral dialogue 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As long as readiness is our number one priority, then it's hard to say self-development outside of the narrow band of immediate readiness is important because the time demands on readiness mean I only have so much time • Overwhelmed with tasks and we don't do a very good job of prioritizing • Then of course cost, we reduced the number of courses available, we changed instructor student ratio. You go from small group, collegiate level discussion/interaction to one over the world, large group instruction • In this current job I have, I think I do it less. It's a matter of time • You have to balance so many things and you have to take care of your unit..., yourself..., the organization. So I think you just run out of time • There's a lot of things you can do, but the value is not put on it. It's not measured. 	Priority	
1st Order Code Examples	Categories	Themes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I, get up early, come home late and rely really on my operational experiences to, have provided the most of my development as an officer • Haven't had the time between family and operational assignments and deployments • OPTEMPO when I was in operational units was so hard or fast that there was really almost no opportunities for self-development • For guys that are running with the operational army to have a meaningful outside of your work day, self-development effort • They certainly put their money where their mouth is operationally • And operationally, it absolutely does. • You can't entrust [SD] to the senior rater or the rater cause all they're focused on is maximizing the value of that officer for the good of the operational assignment they're in den. • We were so busy just focused on doing our mission • I would say that it's operationally focused 	Operational	Competing domains
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I do credit the army with my institutional development. I would say it's probably vastly exceeded what I thought I would get throughout my career 	Institutional	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • By and large, if I reflect back on my Captain's Career Course, did it prepare me for what was to follow in my career? I think, and the answer is, absolutely, yes, it did. Did SAMS and did CTSD prepare me for services as field grade officer in most areas? Yeah. Yes. So I think they were effective. • The army does invest in its service members at grade throughout the long arc of their careers, in educational opportunities • The education I got at the War College was one of the best educations I ever received • PME is the foundation • When it was their time to be developed, we sent them to Iraq and Afghanistan instead of learning how to attack in the fed, which was the process we've had. • I used PME and the institutional domain, all the older courses I'd been to, to just sort of build upon that • The institutional domain's like going to the gym every day. And then all of a sudden, once you leave the institutional domain, you stop going to the gym. • There's incredible pressure on personnel and cost. The pressure of personnel and cost has further reduced the institute. We can't have as big a TTHL account so we shorten the number of school days. • Then of course cost, we reduced the number of courses available, we changed instructor student ratio. You go from small group, collegiate level discussion/interaction to one over the world, large group instruction 		
1 st Order Code Examples	Categories	Themes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I'd like to think I've read books that have caused me to grow, change my opinion and some of those thought processes • We tried to encourage leaders to read • A lot of different reading assignments that covered leadership, MacArthur, and some other things • Books on learning theory or philosophy that would've given me greater depth rather than just technical knowledge • By and large, it comes from professional readings 	Reading	What works
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A lot of things you learn throughout trial and error, trial by fire, which are all good. I mean, you get the reps under your belt 	Experience	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It was fairly effective because it was, I won't say regimented, but it was at least structured and had a recurring internal company OPDs that then led to battalion OPDs. They really built on each other and they required the officers that were given the instruction to do all the preparation • It's effective and a means that brings everybody together 	OPD / LPD	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • She's somebody who pushed me to do better for myself academically, and professionally, and personally to learn and grow over time 	Mentoring	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It was the bottom up kind of spark that got people to start a mentorship or a process by which we then for a period of time... And again, it's really leader driven • Probably the most influential man in my life outside of members of my own family. There's no doubt in my mind, I would not be where I am today, if not for him • I've been blessed with some really good mentors • I think one of the other mentors for me is my father • I've been very fortunate to have some solid mentors • That relationship grew from good leadership to mentorship. ...invested a lot of energy into me... [the] majority of it was a direct focus on my self-development... pushing read..., to write more • So, you almost have to entrust self-development to mentors 		
<p align="center">1st Order Code Examples</p>	<p align="center">Categories</p>	<p align="center">Themes</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I would say the first 10 years it was no • There was a lot of transition of people in positions preventing me from really getting a lot of mentorship from my senior leadership • Then you have other leaders who maybe were never mentored themselves or never really fully grasped or it just wasn't within their personality profile to be maybe a good mentor • Also the mentorship that a lot of people in the military probably say that they don't receive. • In general the candid feedback is missing • I personally don't necessarily have anyone that I call a mentor • No. None. That was pretty easy • Mentorship, what do we mean when we say mentorship? • Nor was I emphasized at any point from any of my leaders or senior leaders in any discussions I had with them • I don't think they really did. I had very few people who are senior to me who did take anything interest in it at all. They were pretty much laissez faire • Do we have leaders who are self-developed themselves or have a heavy educational background to actually be good mentors? • There's no particular leader of mine, company commanders, field grades, anything like that, that encouraged [me] • No, and it's been that way my entire career • I've got to admit, especially when I was a junior officer, I never really experienced a "mentor". I read about it, heard about it, and never really felt like I ever had a formal mentor per se • I came into the Army in '93, until now, I was told about mentors... that I should cultivate a mentor or two... And I didn't take that advice • I just didn't experience it [mentoring] myself at an early age 	<p align="center">Lack of mentoring</p>	<p align="center">What's not working</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Oh, mentors. That's a sore subject for me. I would not say that... I did not have any mentors in my basic branch • I think by the time I figured out what I wished I had known when I was younger, I just resolved that I would do that [mentoring] for other people • Mentorships one of these things the army's always talked about [went on to bash it] • Where you have senior officers who didn't do any kind of mentoring or any type of self-development help for junior officers • Unless I went out of my way to go find one there sure wasn't anybody volunteering to mentor me... I don't think I really got my act together until I was about 10 years into the Army because of that [heard often] 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I'd say he was almost anti-intellectual [that I was] being a little too bookish • He's actually asked me point blank, how do you find time to read? • I could read 20 slides or a 40 page paper. I can say, yep, check the block. I read it (did not understand it) • I don't know anybody... that's home before 7, so if you're going home and you're not a warrior monk 	Anti-Intellectual	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The field grade officers recognize the value, but the junior, the company grade officers, we didn't get it, • I'm infinitely more self-aware, and I think that increased every year of my life. <i>Meaning they were not before</i> • It was limited. • And I failed to take the advice that I was given when I first came in and that has been to my detriment. And so I wish I would have done what I was told in that regard • What I didn't see was that those relationships early in my career would continue to influence me for the next 20 years plus in ways I couldn't even imagine [why]... because I was an immature, younger officer and as far as I was concerned, I was probably getting out after company command. • I think myself as a major or a lieutenant colonel, I wasn't completely self-aware. It's taken me a long time to become self-aware, and to better know what my strengths and weaknesses are • I really wasn't into the self-development domain too much • I don't think self-development was a thing back then as far as something that were pushing. • We do a pretty much of a hand wave over self-development. I felt that pretty much my whole career, we talk about it, but I don't think that we... • it's like I did as a young major, we really understand all the different dynamics and variables that we're dealing with. 	"Didn't get it" / Lacks Self-awareness	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I don't see the rewards on the back end, the confirmation from the senior leaders when it's been done and done well, there is no reward • There would have to be some sort of outward signs that the culture can then see as a benefit of self-development. • I think the Army says a lot of things that they mean, but they don't really reinforce and they don't really reward • It's more of the carrot versus the stick kind of thing • I'm more interested in things that are going to engage me for my lifetime • An officer's motivation to develop himself further, it's not really rewarded. • Self-development is not part of that reward system, if that makes sense. • For some people it'll be incentives. If they get a master's degree on their own or they do something on the own does that increase their promotion potential, to get recognized • I thought would give me a market advantage in understanding my job. • I did the minimum to get done with ILE, because to me there was no incentive to be the honor graduate. • Adults won't learn or won't invest as much in learning if they don't see the utility in what it is they're being taught • I don't see the rewards on the back end, the confirmation from the senior leaders when it's been done and done well, there is no reward. • So again, there was no incentive 	Lack of Reward / Incentive	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I mean, we know what our weaknesses are. The difference is, leaders that excel are ones that do something about it • If a soldier or officer doesn't realize that they have a deficiency and there's no assessment that happens up front, it's really challenging for them to then come up with a plan on how to fix that, or at least on how to improvement it. • <i>If you had done 360 20 years ago - Oh, it would've been phenomenal</i> • I certainly would have benefited from that kind of 360 assessment and you know, meaningful insight into career management, as a Lieutenant captain • And there was no feedback loop from somebody to say, "Hey, we really needed you to do that." 	Poor 360	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make them all come up with a self development plan and we capture that on their support forms for their counseling. • Make them pick one, the leadership dimension that they're weakest at, or that they need to improve the most, and then they come up with a concrete way to improve that facet of their leader core competencies. 	Poor Counseling	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> We're required to counsel our subordinates. And what we do, the program gives us a lot of latitude. We can go, essentially, pretty minimal. 		
1st Order Code Examples	Categories	Themes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> So I needed to up my game because if I was going to execute in my chosen profession, I needed to be at least as good as, if not better than my peers going forward. And that was my whole motivation was, "Hey, you got to be the best you can be." I had to pursue that and compete for a slot to get into that I competed for, and was selected to attend, the Advanced Strategic Arts Program Well I would say it was kind of an inherent, may it might not have come from a great place, but it came from a competitive place How can I gain those little, that little advantage, that niche advantage If you really want to get ahead, you need to get your ass in a school because that's going to be a big boost to your evaluation criteria You kind of get this sense of wanting to keep up with the Joneses. I wanted to be better than, than the peers. I thought would give me a market advantage in understanding my job. It was unhealthy, but, it was, I think from a good place. It was competition It came from a competitive place I wanted to be better than, than the peers. If I'm not learning something from someone every day I feel like I've lost ground 	Competition	Individual Motivations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> And all of a sudden, at the lieutenant level, it just clicked for me How do you impart the next step, the spark that you have? I just was open to input from everybody around me, from above, my peers and below. It only takes a little bit to spark that fire under them and to get them on that path of just consuming any and everything that they can to grow I don't think a lot of folks have something or have an event that sparks that desire in them to really put that self-development aspect of it in overdrive. I realized pretty quickly there was a whole aspect to warfare that I flat out did not understand And that is really what encouraged me to continue to grow and develop, watching other folks as they were going through their own developmental journey. But it was just that spark and what I learned coming out of that, I had that same self-development spark as those that I'd seen years before. I think in my experience it was a series of epiphanies. 	Spark	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I can remember reading those and it was just like this magical light bulb came on.... And it was incredible 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Probably influenced and informed by the peers around me • Has been the peers that I've interacted with in the army • Most of the inspiration for that came from peers, not from superiors or juniors. • Watching other folks as they were going through their own developmental journey. • Most of the inspiration for that came from peers, not from superiors or juniors. • Peers, for sure. Particularly, as majors and lieutenant colonels. • "Wow." I'm a much better officer today as a result of this motivation than I would have been if I wasn't surrounded with people like that. • The greatest inspiration for me, given where I came from in terms of self-development has been the peers that I've interacted with in the army. • What are those skills or attributes that you admire in others that you maybe don't see in yourself that you'd like to learn more about? 	Peers	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creates a mental conflict where people who should consider professional development and self-development as part of their job see it as something that is addition to their job • I thought that being an academic institution and most of the professors here are PhDs that it would be good for me and good for the institution if I work towards a PhD • I didn't have to do it, but I wanted to do it because out of pride, I think, partially. But also I thought as an army officer, if you're offered an opportunity to take a course • I have duties that require me to do a lot of reading and writing on my own • If you're going to be an expert in any subject, you have to stay abreast of the different perspectives and discussions that are in the field • Being a team player is more important than being number one. • So mine was always job based, right? • "Oh my goodness, I don't truly understand how to synchronize fires. I do not truly understand everything I need to know about my profession." • I decided to do it on my own, because I was very uncomfortable in the unit that I was in because I didn't understand the language that they were speaking professionally, • be tactically and technically proficient. So how do I develop that? And it was for me just to read, to gain the experience vicariously, • "I'm reading. It's part of my job." 	Duty	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Another way of describing what we've always been expected to do, which is continue your own professional development 	Expectation	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I don't care what field you're in, you're expected to do that • I always thought it was incumbent upon me, • I thought it was important that I know what the heck I was doing • Every soldier should be a lifelong learner and has a responsibility, an inherent responsibility, to continue to develop themselves, 		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not just prudent for the profession, but also for me, to be a professional, to self-develop from commissioning onwards • I'm not comfortable that I understand fully why or how the operational strategic level works • tend to be self-motivated. • My PhD was a huge investment of mine on my own personal development and my own self-development. No one forced me to go. • I'm self-disciplined to do it, and two, I have the time or make the time to follow it. • I wanted to be a leader that would make a difference. • I read a book a week, which has been a struggle. But now that I do it, the discipline's there • Ability to make a difference and be a part of something • So a lot of it what's our passion? 	Caring or Self-disciplined	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Army hasn't done enough to help shape people's curiosity for developing themselves. • It has to be interesting to you • That's because we're individually curious and we care • That conversation fascinated me to death • Naturally curious person • It's been innate in me • Individual curiosity I think is a big deal • been naturally curious, and that led me to explore issues, ideas, challenges on my own and become a self-learner • other people are motivated just by natural curiosity, and you just got to find those theories that they're curious about and encourage them to explore them and maybe give them opportunities to explore that • What can I do to be better? What a I need to better myself? How do I expand my mind? • There's a nexus between mentorship and people who desire mentorship, and people who are inquisitive about themselves, about how they can improve themselves and improve others. • The amount of curiosity that they have of just the world around them. • By reading, being inquisitive, • Then you'll have the extraordinary 10% that are super curious and will take care of themselves and others. That's just normal. • Some people who are predisposed towards it, so your low hanging fruit are those people who are probably naturally curious people. 	Curiosity	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • But we don't look at the other aspects of an individuals competencies and attributes and assess them the same way and then come up with a plan to develop them • Something that we have to introduce formally to them • So essentially individuals are making it up largely on their own. • But are we really teaching them how to leader develop? • It's a badge of honor to be able to say, "I don't know how to do that." "Good. I'm glad you don't know how to do that because we're going to teach you." • Whether it be counseling, coaching, mentoring, those type things in order to inspire in them that will and that desire to want to self-develop. • Spend time helping people understand the utility and making clear the utility of why they're learning what they're learning, in real ways that they can understand and internalize. Not just telling them they're learning this because it's important for them to learn. 	<p>Develop others</p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Back in the mid-90s I think our professional officer course did a good job of providing that direction • So I've gotten older, I've decided that I want to read sometimes a little bit less of what I think the army wants me to read and a little bit more of what I want to read • Why am I here? What did I do differently? And how can I help other people look at problems? Because I get that now. • You got to really look in the mirror one morning, and be like, all right. • I think in my experience it was a series of epiphanies. • I don't think I really got my act together until I was about 10 years into the Army because of that. • I tribute my own personal self-development is absolutely decisive to the success I had as an Army officer in terms of both personal career success • When I was a junior officer, I was somewhat skeptical of that and I am no longer • I think the older ones of us who are still around and we probably need to take a few minutes and think about what is it that I wished I had known how to do and help pay that forward to the group that's still here that • It wasn't until probably at [inaudible 00:04:28] as a senior captain after command that I realized I need to start back in an educational loop for improving myself. 	<p>Reflecting on past</p>	

Appendix K: Proposed Solutions by Officers

Proposed Solutions by Officers

- I'd start at PME
- What about like a sabbatical? Something like that?
- You almost have to cut out time and make it mandatory for all units to do that
- There's this phenomenon emerging, and it's predominantly powered by social media, where you have groups of officers and groups of professionals getting together to discuss and debate things. It's almost like a social media powered, small group, if that makes sense.
- I'd probably cull the number of books on the Army reading list
- Then I'd want to go to a cohort of senior folks, and ask a series of real, introspective questions of these cohorts of people, to gain an assessment
- Disconnect it from the Army and say your self-development is based off of you
- Part of that is trust. We've got to start trusting our junior leaders more
- You have to either outsource it or come up with the retirees, and maybe that is the outsourcing solution?
- Carve out space in an officer's career, so they have more time for self-development, so they're not always trying to get the next ticket punched
- We really got to understand people and how they learn and what's going to work and then teach leaders to understand and recognize that
- Your cookie cutter approach won't necessarily work but then how can you modify and then tailor it so that you do get the max output for what we're putting into self-development and trying to, how do you create that spark?
- The better we can get at trying to articulate or communicate [SD]
- We have a hard time in the Army, because of how slowly we move, in terms of trying to make this interesting to younger officers
- Set a different, maybe learning model and different experiential opportunities
- Much more flexible leader development model
- They had the luxury back then, in the mid war years, of long assignments
- A recognition that people learn in different ways

Appendix L: Army Core Leader Competencies




Figure 1L. Army Core Leader Competencies

Source: United States Department of the Army (DA) (2019, pp. 1–16)

Appendix M: Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACT	Army Career Tracker
ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ALDM	Army Leader Development Model
ALDP	Army Leader Development Program
ALDS	Army's Leadership Development Strategy
AR	Army Regulation
ARI	Army Research Institute
ATLD	Army Training and Leader Development
ATP	Army Techniques and Procedures
CSA	Chief of Staff of the Army
CASAL	Center for Army Leadership's Survey of Army Leadership
DA	Department of the Army
DOD	Department of Defense
FM	Field Manual
LDTF	Leader Development Task Force
LPD	Leader Professional Development
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel
MSAF	Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officers
OCS	Officer Candidate School
OPD	Officer Professional Development
PRO	Personal Responsibility Orientation (model)
RIF	Reduction in Force
ROTC	Army's Reserve Officers' Training Corps
SD	Self-development
USMA	United States Military Academy